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SECURED TRANSACTIONS-WHAT
FLOATS CAN BE SUNK
JACK

B.

JUSTICEf

E VEN

THE MOST CASUAL OBSERVER of developments in
commercial law knows something about the floating lien, a
"colorful term" ' 1 used to describe an arrangement under which a
security interest attaches to a shifting body of collateral. 2 For example, a security interest may float from a retailer's inventory to the
accounts which arise when that inventory is sold, and it may also float
to new inventory which the retailer later acquires. The floating lien,
expressly validated by section 9-204(3) of the Uniform Commercial
Code (Code),3 has often been litigated 4 and analyzed at length by
5
commentators.
Recently, in a single decision, In re E.A. Fretz Co.,6 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit both launched and sank
the "floating secured party," a term utilized by the court to characterize an attempt to perfect a security interest by filing a financing
statement naming as secured party a person other than the one to

I Partner, Drinker, Biddle & Reath, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. A.B., West Virginia University, 1952; B.A. in Jur., Oxford University, 1954. Member, Pennsylvania Bar.
The author acknowledges the helpful comments of Carl W. Funk and Joseph A.
Dworetzky.
1. Coogan, Article 9-An Agenda for the Next Decade, 87 YALE L.J. 1012, 1016 n.21
(1978).
2. See id. at 1016-17, 1016 n.21, 1017 n.22.
3. U.C.C. § 9-204(3).
4. E.g., Biggins v. Southwest Bank, 490 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1973) (valid security interest
created as to after acquired demonstration vehicles purchased by dealer from its own inventory);
Grain Merchants of Ind., Inc. v. Union Bank & Say. Co., 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 827 (1969) (transfer of security interest in accounts receivable "now or hereafter received" was transfer of all accounts receivable as an entity and occurred for bankruptcy purposes
at time of filing of financing statement); In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., 271 F. Supp.
395 (D. Or. 1967), aff'd sub nor. DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969) (no
preference for bankruptcy purposes occurred since transfer of security interest in present and
future accounts receivable was viewed as single entity); Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Salerno, 168
Conn. 152, 362 A.2d 904 (1975) (plaintiff had perfected security interest in inventory acquired
after merger).
5. E.g., I G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 11.7, at 359-65
(1965); Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: PrioritiesAnsong Secured Creditors
and the "Floating Lien," 72 HARV. L. REV. 838 (1959); Countryman, Code Security Interests in
Bankruptcy, 75 COM. L.J. 269 (1970); Henson, "Proceeds" Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 232 (1965).
6. 565 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1978). For a discussion of In re E.A. Fretz Co. which approves
the Fifth Circuit's decision but criticizes some of its reasoning, see 31 VAND.

L. REV. 716

(1978).

(867)

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1979

1

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 5 [1979], Art. 2

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

V.
[VOL.
24: p. 867

whom the secured debt was owed. 7 In using that term, the court's
intention clearly was not to praise but to scorn. 8
There is another sense in which a security interest might be described as "floating." The Code explicitly recognizes that the obligations secured by a security interest 9 may include "future advances or
other value."10 For example, a series of loans may constitute future
advances covered by a single security agreement." The term "other
value" includes such disparate obligations as liability for an overdraft
in a checking account 12 or liability as an endorser of a note.' 3 The
Fifth Circuit made a passing reference to this concept, which it described as "floating debt," 14 but apparently did not consider it relevant to the Fretz case.
This article will use the Fretz case as the context for a discussion
of both floating secured parties and floating debt.
I.

THE FRErZ CASE

A. The Facts
On April 3, 1971, E.A. Fretz Co., Inc. (Fretz) gave Revlon, Inc.
(Revlon) a security interest in Fretz's equipment and inventory, then
owned or thereafter acquired, and the proceeds thereof. 1 5 The security agreement explicitly provided that the security interest was to
secure not only Fretz's debts to Revlon but also its debts to any affiliate of Revlon and its debts to others which Revlon or any affiliate
of Revlon might acquire "by assignment or otherwise." 16 On April
5, 1971, a financing statement naming Revlon as secured party was
filed in the appropriate place. 1 7 On June 30, 1971, Fretz gave Re-

7. 565 F.2d at 369.
8. "In this country 'floating lien' is a term more often used in scorn or anger than in praise,
although in England and Canada it has long been respectable for liens to float." 1 G. GILMORE,
supra note 5, § 11.7, at 359 (footnote omitted).
9. U.C.C. § 1-201(37). The Code defines "security interest" as "an interest in personal
property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation." Id.
10. Id. § 9-204(3).
11. Maloy v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 139 Ga. App. 798, 799, 229 S.E.2d 678, 680 (1976).
12. In re Midas Coin Co., 264 F. Supp. 193, 194 (E.D. Mo. 1967), aff'd per curiam sub
norn. Zuke v. St. John's Community Bank, 387 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1968); In re Zwicker, 8
U.C.C. Rep. (Callaghan) 924, 926 (W.D. Wis. 1971); South County Sand & Gravel Co. v.
Bituminous Pavers Co., 106 R.I. 178, 184, 256 A.2d 514, 517 (1969).
13. South County Sand & Gravel Co. v. Bituminous Pavers Co., 106 R.I. 178, 184, 256
A.2d 514, 517-18 (1969).
14. 565 F.2d at 369.
15. Id. at 367-68.
16. Id. at 368 (footnote omitted).
17. Id.
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public National Bank (Bank) a security interest in Fretz's inventory
and its proceeds, and on August 11, 1971, a financing statement naming the Bank as secured party was filed in the appropriate place. 18
When Fretz subsequently filed a bankruptcy petition on August
23, 1972, it was indebted not only to Revlon and the Bank but also to
two Revlon subsidiaries. 19 On September 19, 1972, the two subsidiaries assigned their claims to Revlon. 20 The bankruptcy judge
held that all of Revlon's claims had priority over the Bank's claims,
and the district. court affirmed. 2' On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed with respect to the claims assigned to Revlon by its subsid22
iaries.
It is not easy to identify the Fretz court's precise holding. Its
opinion began with a statement that "[tihe most intriguing issue" before it was "whether the Uniform Commercial Code, construed in
light of the policies underlying the Bankruptcy Act, permits the use
of 'floating secured parties' in secured transactions." 2 3 The court
stated "that the post-bankruptcy assignments of the subsidiaries'
claims against Fretz to Revlon were ineffective to create perfected security interests in favor of" the subsidiaries, 24 but its extended discussion of that proposition was superfluous since Revlon's claim was not
based on an argument that a security interest had been granted to the
subsidiaries. 25
Instead, Revlon maintained that the indebtedness which the subsidiaries had assigned to Revlon was secured by a perfected security
interest granted to Revlon. 2 6 That straightforward argument,
whether sound or not, was not adequately addressed by the court.
Revlon's argument can be elaborated in the following propositions:
1. Fretz had created in favor of Revlon a security interest
which, by its terms, secured Fretz's debts to the subsidiaries.
2. The financing statement naming Revlon as secured party
gave other interested persons notice that Revlon might have a security interest in the collateral described, thereby enabling them to

18. Id.
19. Id. at 368-69.
20. 1d. at 368.
21. Id.at 369.
22. Id. The court noted that one of the subsidiaries had filed its own
"some two months after" the Bank's statement was filed. Id. at 371 n.15.
however, give the subsidiary priority over the Bank. Id. at 375.
23. Id. at 367.
24. Id. at 369.
25. Brief for Appellee at 18, In re E.A. Fretz Co., 565 F.2d 366 (5th
26. Brief for Appellee at 12, Ir re E.A. Fretz Co., 565 F.2d 366 (5th

financing statement
That filing did not,

Cir. 1978).
Cir. 1978).
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make the inquiries "necessary to disclose the complete state of affairs," 27 including the fact that the security interest covered debt
owed to the subsidiaries and debt which might later be assigned to
Revlon.
3. Therefore, the security interest in favor of Revlon was perfected with respect to the debts to the subsidiaries. 2"
The Fretz court addressed the second of these propositions, conceding that the Code requires only a notice filing, 2 9 but did not
otherwise consider Revlon's argument. Instead, the court returned to
its own theme that the subsidiaries themselves did not hold perfected
security interests,3 0 Its reasoning can be stated as follows:
1. The Code requires a notice "that the secured party who
has filed may have a security interest in the collateral described." 31
2. The financing statement naming Revlon as secured party
did not disclose that the subsidiaries might have a security interest
32
in the collateral described.
3. Therefore, the subsidiaries did not have perfected security
33
interests.
The Fretz court concluded its discussion of the Code with the
following peroration:
We believe that in a world of huge conglomerates a construction of the UCC's silence as to "floating secured parties" which
would sanction such a weird device is clearly at odds with the
"simple notice" requirements of § 9.402. Placing our imprimatur
on floating secured parties would undercut "Article Nine's perfection requirement [which] reflects a Code policy against secret security."

3 4

Only after it had turned to a consideration of the applicable
bankruptcy law did the Fifth Circuit acknowledge Revlon's argument

27. U.C.C. § 9-402, Comment 2.
28. Brief for Appellee at 12-21, In re E.A. Fretz Co., 565 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1978).
29. 565 F.2d at 370.
30. 1I.at 371.
31. Id.at 370 (emphasis supplied by the court), quoting U.C.C. § 9-402, Comment 2.
32. 565 F.2d at 371.
33. Id. As indicated earlier, Revlon had conceded this conclusion. See text accompanying
note 25 supra.
34. 565 F.2d at 371 (emphasis supplied by the court), quoting J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 24-3, at 868 (1972).
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that a security interest for the debts to Revlon's affiliates "was created
in favor of Revlon ab initio and perfected when the Fretz-Revlon
financing statement was filed."

35

The court, however, simply dis-

missed this argument without analyzing it.3 6 Moreover, although the
Fifth Circuit asserted that to uphold Revlon's claim would be inconsistent with the policy of bankruptcy law, 37 the court purported to
base its decision not on the bankruptcy law, but on the Code. 38
B. The Questions Posed by Fretz
As perceived by the Fifth Circuit, the question in Fretz was
whether a security interest in favor of the subsidiaries could be
created by a security agreement with Revlon and perfected by a
financing statement which named only Revlon as secured party and
made no reference to any security interest claimed by the subsidiaries. 39 By framing the issue in that way, the court was easily
able to conclude that the subsidiaries did not have perfected security
interests.
The Fifth Circuit's statement of the issue did not coincide with
the claim, as asserted and argued before the court, that Revlon, and
not its subsidiaries, had a perfected security interest which secured
the debt originally owed to the subsidiaries and later assigned to Revlon. The court's failure to address adequately Revlon's argument
may have resulted from the court's perception that Revlon had in
reality attempted to accomplish the perfection of a security interest in
favor of its subsidiaries by filing a financing statement naming Revlon
40
as secured party.
This article will proceed on the premise that such a perception is
correct in the sense that the transaction could have been structured
more forthrightly by creating security interests in favor of the subsidiaries and by filing financing statements naming them as secured
parties. Proceeding from that premise, the issue in the Fretz case becomes whether the same objective could be achieved by the alternative structure employed by Revlon and its subsidiaries. More precisely, that issue raises the following questions:

1. Does the Code permit the creation of a security interest in
favor of a secured party [Revlon] as security for the debtor's obligations to persons [the subsidiaries] other than the secured party?
35. 565 F.2d at 374.

36. Id.
37. Id.

38. See id.
39. Id. at 369.
40. Id. at 370.
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2. If the security interest described in question one is valid, is
it perfected by the filing of a financing statement naming the secured party [Revlon] without disclosing that the secured obligations
are owed to other persons [the subsidiaries]?
3. Is a security agreement effective under the Code to the
extent that it purports to secure obligations later acquired by the
secured party [Revlon] from other persons [the subsidiaries]?
4. If the security interest described in question three is fully
effective, is it perfected by the filing of a financing statement naming the secured party [Revlon] without disclosing that it may cover
obligations later acquired from other persons [the subsidiaries]?
5. If the security interests described in questions one and
three are valid and are perfected in the manner described in
questions two and four, does the Code give them priority over a
security interest later perfected in favor of another secured party
[the Bank]?
6. How are the answers to questions one through five affected
by bankruptcy law?
Questions one and two deal with the floating secured party, and
questions three and four deal with floating debt. Revlon's claims in

the Fretz case would be supported by favorable answers to either
questions one and two or questions three and four. Its claims would
also have to survive a consideration of questions five and six. Part II
of this article will deal with floating secured parties, and part III will
deal with floating debt. Each part will consider the relevant priority
and bankruptcy questions.

II.

FLOATING SECURED PARTIES

The sinking of the floating secured party in the Fretz case has
created a whirlpool which could engulf many financial institutions and

other creditors. Many trust companies and other institutions and individuals hold security interests as trustees or agents for groups of
lenders. It thus becomes necessary to determine whether they are
floating within range of the Fretz decision and also whether they are
shielded by protective devices not available to Revlon. The Fifth Cir-

cuit did not consider these questions, although Revlon made refer42
ence to them in a petition for rehearing 4 x which the court denied.

41. Petition for Rehearing of Appellee at 6-9, In re E.A. Fretz Co., 565 F.2d 366 (5th Cir.
1978).
42. Per curiam Order (5th Cir. Mar. 9, 1978). That order did modify the court's original
opinion dated January 4, 1978 in two respects. First, it corrected footnote 15, which originally

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol24/iss5/2
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The court also failed to provide any reasoned basis for distinguishing
its decision from other precedents.
A. Pre-Code Decisions
An authoritative textbook on pre-Code law stated that a chattel
"mortgage may be made to secure debts to others besides the
mortgagee. ' 43 The author cited a Rhode Island decision upholding a
chattel mortgage from a printer to a named mortgagee to secure "all
sums now due or which may become due from .. . [the printer to

the mortgagee] and to all other persons now or heretofore employed,
or hereafter to be employed by . . .[the mortgagor] for the labor or

other services of all such persons." 4 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has also upheld an employer's mortgage
45
to one employee as security for the wage claims of all employees.
Additionally, a New Hampshire court has upheld a mortgage which
was given for the benefit of both the mortgagee and another named
46
person.
In each of those decisions, .the mortgages were given for the
benefit of the mortgagee himself and a narrow class of additional creditors who were clearly identified. Similarly, the security interest in
Fretz was given to secure Revlon and a narrow and clearly identified
class of additional creditors, Revlon's "present and future divisions
47
and affiliates."
Another group of pre-Code decisions upheld chattel mortgages
given to mortagees who had no interest of their own but merely held
the mortgages for the benefit of other persons. 48 The utility of such
arrangements was described by one court in the following way:

stated that one of the subsidiaries had filed a financing statement "two months after bankruptcy." As indicated earlier, the modified opinion acknowledged that the financing statement
was filed "some two months after" the Bank's statement was filed. See note 22 supra. Second,
as a direct result of that correction, the court modified the last paragraph of its original opinion,
which had stated that neither subsidiary had a valid lien. As modified, the opinion left that
question unresolved as to the subsidiiry which had filed its own financing statement. 565 F.2d
at 375.
43. 1 L. JONES, THE LAW OF CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES § 84, at 157
(6th ed. 1933).
44. Spencer v. Pierce. 5 R.I. 63, 64 (1857), cited in L. JONES, supra note 43, § 84, at 157
n.47.

45. In re Jackson, 18 F.2d 462, 464 (6th Cir. 1927).
46. Morse v. Powers, 17 N.H. 286, 297 (1845).
47. 565 F.2d at 368 n.2 (emphasis omitted).
48. In re Pilot Radio & Tube Corp., 5 F. Supp. 453, 455 (D. Mass. 1933), aff'd, 72 F.2d
316 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 584 (1934) (mortgage given by debtor to trustee for benefit
of creditor); In re Babb, 41 F.2d 253, 255 (E.D. I11.
1930) (mortgage given by bankrupt to
trustee as security for bona fide debt to bank); Chafey v. Matthews, 104 Mich. 103, 105-06, 62
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A mortgage to a third person would be as valid as a mortgage to a
creditor. The choice of a mortgagee is a matter of convenience, and
there can be no wrong, and there may be some advantage, in giving to all of the secured creditors a control over the security in
which all are ratably interested, and it would effectually prevent
49
any disputes as to priority.
The foregoing decisions appear to represent the rule generally
followed before the adoption of the Code, although there was some
dissent. In 1904, an Illinois court held invalid as against third parties
a recorded mortgage which described the mortgagee as a trustee but
did not identify the beneficiaries. 50 The court expressed concern
that "no one was under any obligation to call upon and inquire of...
[the mortgagee] what relation he sustained to the instrument or
whom he was trustee for; but even had such inquiry been made, he
could have given no information." 5 That decision had little, if any,
precedential value after 1930, when a federal court expressly refused
to treat it as an authoritative statement of Illinois law. 52
Other pre-Code decisions invalidating the use of floating secured
parties were based on statutory provisions. For example, a New
Hampshire statute required the recording of a prescribed form of affidavit which stated that the mortgage secured a debt owed to the
mortgagee. 53 It was held that an affidavit in the statutory form was
false and therefore ineffective with respect to a mortgage securing a
debt owed to another person. 54 As will be seen, there is no similar
problem under the Code.

N.W. 141, 142 (1895) (mortgage given to cashier of bank as security for obligations owed bank);
Foster v. Berkey, 8 Minn. 351, 365 (1863) (mortgage given to wife of creditor as security for

loan); Anderson Buick Co. v. Cook, 7 Wash. 2d 632, 638, 110 P.2d 857, 860 (1941) (mortgage of
automobile naming finance company's creditor, a bank, as mortgagee).

49. Adams v. Nieman, 46 Mich. 135, 137, 8 N.W. 719, 720 (1881).
50. Martin v. Sexton, 112 Ill.App. 199, 214-15 (1904).

51. Id. at 215.
52. In re Babb, 41 F.2d 253, 254 (E.D. Il. 1930). In 1932, the Illinois Court of Appeals

cited the Babb decision in upholding a chattel mortgage given to A as security for debts to B,
C, and D. Citizens State Bank v. Senesac, 267 Ill. App. 288, 293-94 (1932). It should be noted
that these two Illinois decisions can be distinguished. In the Senesac case, although the debts
were in reality owned to B, C, and D, they were evidenced by a note made payable to A and
then assigned to B, C, and D. Id. at 290. As a matter of form, therefore, the mortgage secured
a debt nominally owed to the mortgagee. A similar arrangement was upheld in Gilmore v.
Roberts, 79 Wis. 450, 48 N.W. 522 (1891).

53. N.H. Rev. Stat. ch. 132, § 3 (1842) (repealed 1961), cited in Parker v. Morrison, 46
N.H. 280, 282 (1865).
54. Parker v. Morrison, 46 N.H. 280, 283 (1865). Cf. Morse v. Powers, 17 N.H. 286, 297

(1845) (to be valid, a mortgage need not be entirely for the mortgagee's benefit).
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B. The Code Provisions
The term "security interest" is defined in section 1-201(37)55 as
an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment
or performance of an obligation." 5 6 There is no basis, in either the
text of or the comments to that section, for drawing an inference that
the secured obligation must be owed to the secured party.
The term "secured party" is defined in the first sentence of section 9-105(1)(m) 57 as follows: " 'Secured party' means a lender, seller
or other person in whose favor there is a security interest, including a
person to whom accounts or chattel paper have been sold." 5 8 Considered by themselves, the words "or other person in whose favor
there is a security interest" are sufficiently broad to include a person
in whose favor a security interest is given as security for an obligation
owed to another person. Contextual considerations, however, might
require the implication of a narrower meaning.
First, it could be argued that "lender, seller or other person"
suggests that the other person, like the lender and the seller, must
be one to whom an obligation is owed. This interpretation could be
buttressed by references to other sections of the Code. For example,
section 9-107" 9 provides that "[a] security interest is a 'purchase
money security interest' to the extent that it is (a) taken or retained
by the seller of the collateral" or "(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives value." 60 Similarly,
section 9-10861 provides that a security interest in after acquired collateral shall be deemed to be taken for new value "[wihere a secured
party makes an advance, incurs an obligation, releases a perfected
62
security interest, or otherwise gives new value."
Another argument could be based on the second sentence of section 9-105(1)(m), which provides: "When the holders of obligations
issued under an indenture of trust, equipment trust agreement or the
like are represented by a trustee or other person, the representative
is the secured party." 63 That provision might be interpreted as a

55. U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
56. Id.

57. Id. § 9-105(1)(m).
58. Id.

59. ld. § 9-107.
60. Id.

,61. td. §9-108.
62. Id.
63. Id. § 9-105(1)(n).
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limited exception to a requirement that the secured party be the person to whom the secured debt is owed.
Whatever impact these contextual arguments might otherwise
have is nullified by the commentary of the principal draftsman of Article 9,64 Grant Gilmore, who, referring to the words "or other person" in the first sentence of section 9-105(1)(m), has stated: "[C]onceivably, A might make a loan to debtor X and have the resulting
security interest run in favor of B. At least for formal purposes B
would be the secured party, although, if he were merely A's
nominee, A would be the beneficial owner."6 5 Discussing the second sentence of section 9-105(1)(m), Professor Gilmore continued:
This sentence seems to have been put in by excess of caution.
It does no harm but, even without it, no one could have doubted
that an indenture trustee was entitled to sign, file and so on for the
bond holders. It goes without saying that the "trustee or other person" becomes a secured party only for formal purposes; the "holders" of [the] obligations" remain the beneficial owners of the interest. There appears to be no good reason (except to make things

clear to the members of the corporate bar) why the sentence is
restricted to transactions which involve "an indenture of trust,
equipment trust agreement or the like;" presumably any sort of

trustee, fiduciary or representative could qualify as "secured
66
party," for formal purposes, for those whom he represents.
In other words, section 9-105(1)(m) should not be viewed as
limiting the use of surrogates as secured parties to transactions in
which they are true fiduciaries. On the other hand, Professor Gilmore's comments do imply that the secured party must have some
representative relationship with the person to whom the secured obligation is owed. This implication will be discussed further in the next
6
section of this article.

7

Other sections of the Code use completely neutral language that
is consistent with Professor Gilmore's interpretation of section
9-105(1)(m). For purposes of the Fretz case, the most significant is
section 9-203(1),68 which provides that a security interest is not
enforceable against the debtor or third parties "and does not attach
unless (a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured party pur-

64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. art. 9.
1 G. GILMORE, supra note 5, § 10.4, at 305 (footnote omitted).
Id. (footnote omitted).
See text accompanying notes 105 & 106 infra.

68. U.C.C. § 9-203(1).
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suant to agreement, or the debtor has signed a security agreement
; and (b) value has been given; and (c) the debtor has rights in
the collateral." 69 There is no suggestion in section 9-203(1) that the
'agreement" must be between the debtor and the person to whom
the secured obligation is owed or that the "value" must be given by
the secured party. The language of section 9-203(1) is completely
70
neutral on both points.
Assuming that the secured party may be a person other than one
to whom the secured debt is owed, questions arise concerning the
type of filing required to perfect the security interest, whether the
financing statement must disclose that the secured party is only a
representative, and whether it must identify the beneficial owner or
owners of the security interest.
In reponse to these questions, section 9-402(1)71 provides simply
that "[a] financing statement is sufficient if it gives the names of the
73
debtor and the secured party."72 Comment two to section 9-402
states that the section adopts a system of "notice filing," that "[t]he
notice itself indicates merely that the secured party who has filed may
have a security interest in the collateral described," and that
"[f]urther inquiry from the parties concerned will be necessary to
74
disclose the complete state of affairs."
If the secured party is simply the person to whom the security
interest is given, even when that person is only a substitute for the
real creditors, the financing statement should be sufficient if it names
that person. There is no need for the statement itself to disclose that
the secured party is a representative or to identify the persons represented. It serves as notice that the secured party, as either the real
or nominal owner, may have a security interest. Interested persons
may then initiate further inquiries to determine the complete state of
affairs.
C. Decisions Under The Code
With the exception of Fretz, the reported decisions are in accord
with the foregoing analysis. For example, in Industrial Packaging
69. Id.
70. Another example of neutral language is U.C.C. § 9-208(2), which requires the secured
party to respond to the debtor's statement of "the obligation" without any suggestion that it
refers only to an obligation owed to the secured party. Id. Similarly, U.C.C. § 9-504(1)(b) refers

simply
71.
72.
73.
74.

to "indebtedness secured by the security interest." Id.
Id. § 9-402(l).
Id.
Id. Comment 2.
Id.
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Products Co. v. Fort Pitt Packaging International, Inc.,75 financing
statements naming a trust company as secured party were filed in
1955 in connection with a transaction during which the debtor incurred obligations to the trust company. 7 6 In 1957, the same debtor
obtained a loan from a finance company and agreed to secure that
loan by assigning its right in a government contract to the trust
company as agent for the finance comany. 77 The 1955 filing covered
accounts receivable, and no additional filing was made. 78 When the
debtor became bankrupt, its receiver asserted that the financing
statements filed in 1955 did not perfect a security interest covering
the obligation to repay the finance company's loan. 79 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the security interest was in fact perfected,8 0 stating that the Code does not require that the secured
party named in a financing statement be "a principal creditor and not
an agent." 81
In a more recent case, In re Cushman Bakery,8 2 Cushman Baking Company and Cushman Bakery (Cushman) had arranged to receive a loan from Seaboard Allied Milling Corporation (Seaboard). 83
The loan was not made directly by Seaboard to Cushman,
however, but through an intermediary, Bakers Management Corporation (Bakers Management), an affiliate of Seaboard. 4 As security,
Cushman gave Bakers Management a real estate mortgage and security interests in Cushman's personal property.85 Financing statements naming Bakers Management as secured party were filed. 86
When Cushman subsequently became bankrupt more than four
months later, its trustee challenged the security interest, arguing that
the financing statements were defective because they failed to disclose Seaboard's interest. 8 7 The United States Court of Appeals for

75. 399 Pa. 643, 161 A.2d 19 (1960).
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

645-46, 161 A.2d
646, 161 A.2d at
648, 161 A.2d at
647-48, 161 A.2d

at 20.
20.
21.
at 21.

80. Id. at 648-49, 161 A.2d at 21-22.
81. Id. at 648, 161 A.2d at 21.
82. 526 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 937 (1976). The bankruptcy judge's

decision concerning the perfection of the security interest was reversed by the United States
District Court for the District of Maine. In re Cushman Bakery, 14 U.C.C. Rep. (Callaghan)

267 (D. Me. 1974), rev'd, 16 U.C.C. Rep. (Callaghan) 897 (D. Me. 1975). The United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed in part. 526 F.2d at 23.
83. 526 F.2d at 25.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 26.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 27.
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879

the First Circuit rejected that argument, citing Industrial Packaging8 8 and the discussion of notice filing in the comments to section 9-402,89 and held that the security interests were perfected. 90
There is, of course, a formal distinction between the arrangements in the Industrial Packaging and Cushman cases. In Cushman,
the secured debt was held, at least nominally, by the secured party, 9 1
but that was not the situation in Industrial Packaging.92 This difference is a possible ground for distinguishing the cases. 9 3 It also is a
possible basis for differentiating Industrial Packaging from two other
decisions which held that a financing statement naming a bank as
secured party is sufficient to perfect the entire security interest despite the fact that the bank has assigned participations, undivided
fractional interests in both the secured debt and the security interest,
to other persons. 94 When, as a matter of form, the secured debt is
owed to the secured party, it is inconsistent with the text of the
Code 95 to assert that the financing statement must disclose either the
fact that others hold undivided fractional interests or the identity of
9
those participants. 6

88. Id. at 30, citing Industrial Packaging Prods. Co. v. Fort Pitt Packaging Int'l, Inc., 399
Pa. 643, 648, 161 A.2d 19, 21 (1960). See notes 75-81 and accompanying text supra.
89. 526 F.2d at 29, citing U.C.C. § 9-402, Comment 2.
90. 526 F.2d at 34.
91. Id. at 25.
92. 349 Pa. at 646, 161 A.2d at 20.
93. See note 52 supra.
94. See In re Fried Furniture Corp., 293 F. Supp. 92, 93 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd per
curiam, 407 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1969) (where the Small Business Administration (SBA) had a 75%
interest in a loan made by a bank, the SBA had a security interest perfected by the bank's
filing); Heights v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 463 Pa. 48, 61-62, 342 A.2d 738, 744 (1975) (bank participating in a loan made by lending bank not required to perfect its security interest in the loan
since the participating bank was a creditor of a secured creditor, the lending bank).
95. Section 9-302(2) of the Code, U.C.C. § 9-302(2), unambiguously provides that "no filing
under this Article is required in order to continue the perfected status" of a security interest
which has been assigned by the secured party. Id.
96. But see Stahl & Pike, Loan Participations:Lead Insolvency and Participants'Rights
(Part II), 95 BANKING L.J. 38, 63-67 (1978). These commentators appear to suggest that the
financing statement should at least indicate that the named secured party is acting as a representative. Id. at 67. This excessively conservative suggestion may have resulted from the author's confusion of two different questions: 1) the kind of filing required to protect the security
interest against the debtor's creditors; and 2) the filing, if any, needed to protect the participants against creditors of the lead bank from which the participants acquired their participations. See id. at 63-67. The answer to the second question depends on how the relationship
between the lead bank and the participants is characterized. If the participants are deemed to
be creditors of the lead bank, they must file financing statements naming the lead bank as
debtor. In re Alda Commercial Corp., 327 F. Supp. 1315, 1318 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); U.C.C. §
9-302, Comment 7. In the typical participation arrangement, however, the participants are not
creditors of the lead bank. See Stratford Financial Corp. v. Finex Corp., 367 F.2d 569, 571 (2d
Cir. 1966). Alternatively, when the lead bank's arrangement with its customer is not a secured
loan but a factoring, an actual purchase, of accounts, the sale of the participations is a resale of
interests in the accounts, which is itself a secured transaction under U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(b). In
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The First Circuit, however, did not rely on any formal distinction in Cushman. Its opinion broadly stated: "The use of a nominee
in real estate transactions, and as mortgagee in a recorded mortgage,
has long been sanctioned as a legitimate practice. . . . The use of a
nominee is likewise legitimate under the Uniform Commercial
97
Code."
One other factual difference between these cases should be discussed. In Industrial Packaging, the debtor and the second lender
had "entered into a written contract" by which the debtor "agreed to
9 8
assign" the collateral to the trust company as the lender's agent.
There is no mention of any similar agreement in either Cushman or
Fretz. It is nonetheless clear that the arrangement in Cushman was
negotiated by persons who represented both Seaboard and Bakers
Management and that Cushman consciously intended to secure Seaboard by giving a security interest to Bakers Management. 9 9 The
facts were similar in Fretz, 0 0 where the bankruptcy judge found that
the business of Revlon and its subsidiaries was essentially conducted
by the same persons from a single office and that the credit relationship between Fretz, Revlon, and the subsidiaries had been under the
control and supervision of a single person. 1° 1
As emphasized earlier, the secured party in Fretz was Revlon
itself, 10 2 and the security agreement between Revlon and Fretz satisfied the requirements of section 9-203(1). 103 If a security agreement
expressly covers an obligation owed to a person other than the secured party, the other person is a third party beneficiary of that
agreement, and it is difficult to discern any policy which would be
served by requiring a second agreement between the debtor and the
other person.
A different question would be presented by a situation in which
a debtor and a secured party gratuitously agreed to secure an obliga-

that case, financing statements must be filed to perfect the participants' security interests. See
1B BENDER'S UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL

CODE SERVICE,

SECURED TRANSACTIONS

UNDER THE

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 23.11[10], at 2405 (1966) [hereinafter cited as SECURED TRANSACTIONS]. Those financing statements must name the lead bank as debtor. See id. § 23.11[3], at
2399 (Case 11); id. § 23.11[11], at 2405-06.
97. 526 F.2d at 30 (citations omitted).
98. 399 Pa. at 646, 161 A.2d at 20.
99. See 526 F.2d at 32.
100. See 565 F.2d at 367-69.
101. Bankruptcy Judge's Findings of Fact, Nos. 7-10, quoted in Brief for Appellee at 7-9, In
re E.A. Fretz Co., 565 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1978). These findings were not challenged on appeal.
565 F.2d at 368 n.1.
102. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
103. See text accompanying notes 68-70 supra.
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tion which the debtor owed to another person who had no relation10 4
ship to the secured party and no knowledge of the arrangement.
Much of the textual analysis of the Code in the preceding section of
this article supports a conclusion that the debt to the stranger is secured. This result is supported by the principle that no knowledge on
the part of a third party beneficiary to a contract is necessary to give
him rights under it.105
As indicated earlier, however, section 9-105(1)(m) and Professor
Gilmore's commentary imply that the secured party must in some
sense "represent" the person to whom the secured obligation is
owed, and a finding that one person represents another should be
based on some actual relationship between them. 10 6 That relationship may be consensual, either explicitly as in Industrial Packaging or
implicitly as in Cushman and Fretz. 10 7 A relationship based on the
status of the parties, as in the case of a corporation and its subsidiary,
should also be sufficient to establish the required representation.
Conversely, upholding the use of a floating secured party in the
absence of any underlying relationship with the person to whom the
secured obligation is owed would be inconsistent with the policy of
section 9-208,108 which establishes a procedure under which the secured party can be required to provide information about the secured
obligations. 10 9 In order to respond to an inquiry under section
9-208, a floating secured party would need to have information about
the obligations owed to the other person or be in a position to obtain
that information. 110 If there is no relationship between them, it is
unlikely that the secured party would either have the necessary information or be in a position to obtain it.
For these reasons, a floating secured party should not be allowed
to hold collateral for the benefit of others with whom it has no relationship based on either status or agreement.
It is interesting to note that the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Fretz
did not even cite Industrial Packaging. Cushman was mentioned only

104. This case could be distinguished from Industrial Packaging, Cushman, and Fretz. For
discussions of these cases, see notes 75-104 and accompanying text supra.
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 137, Comment a (Tent, Drafts Nos. 1-7,

1973).
106.
107.
108.
infra.
109.
110.

See text accompanying notes 59-66 supra.
For a discussion of these cases, see notes 75-104 and accompanying text supra.
U.C.C. § 9-208. For a discussion of this section, see text accompanying notes 121-24
U.C.C. § 9-208.
Id.
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in a footnote in which the court observed that it had considered
"many cases decided under UCC § 9-402 and other relevant sections
and . . . [found] no precedent which would lead . . . [it] to a different
result." 111 While the Fretz court might have distinguished Cushman
on the formal basis suggested above, a careful examination of Industrial Packaging should have led the Fifth Circuit to a different conclusion in Fretz, particularly in view of its previous adherence to the
principle that the court should pursue the Code's objective of uniformity 112 by recognizing the authority of decisions in other jurisdictions. 113 The Fifth Circuit's failure even to mention Industrial Packaging is inexplicable. The court should have been aware of the case
because it cited Cushman, 1 4a which relied principally on Industrial
Packaging.115
The Fifth Circuit's failure to discuss the available precedents is
also regrettable. An explanation of the court's statement that it had
found no precedent which would suggest a different result 116 might
have assisted lawyers who must now attempt to navigate their clients
around the Fretz decision. The only hint to the court's rationale appears in the form of a rhetorical question in a footnote: "Prior to
assignment [of the subsidiaries' claims to Revlon], how could Revlon
have had a lien to secure debt not owed directly to it?" 117 Guided
only by this statement, lawyers may be able to prevent the sinking,
even in the Fifth Circuit, of security interests now held by secured
parties who are also the nominal holders of the secured debt. Those
who were originally the nominal holders of secured debt that was
subsequently assigned in whole or part to others may also be pro-

111. 565 F.2d at 372 n.19 (citations omitted). The footnote also cited In re Fried Furniture
Corp., 293 F. Supp. 92 (E.D.N.Y, 1968), aff'd per curiam, 407 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1969), as one
of the cases the court had considered. 565 F.2d at 372 n.19. See note 94 supra.
112. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(e).
113. Silver v. Gulf City Body & Trailer Works, 432 F.2d 992, 993 (5th Cir. 1970). The Fifth
Circuit in Silver noted that a lack of interpretative decisions by Alabama state courts on a
particular section of the Code, along with "the law's expressed desire for national uniformity in
commercial law, propels us to an examination of the decisional law of the other Uniform Cornmercial Code jurisdictions." Id. One state court has said that Code decisions should be treated
as "compelling authority." Needle v. Lasco Indus., Inc., 10 Cal. App. 3d 1105, 1108, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 593, 595 (1970).
114. 565 F.2d at 372 n.19, citing In re Cushman Bakery, 526 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 937 (1976).
115. 526 F.2d at 30, citing Industrial Packaging Prods. Co. v. Fort Pitt Packaging Int'l, Inc.,
399 Pa. 643, 161 A.2d 19 (1960). In Fretz, counsel for Revlon had also cited Industrial Packaging in their petition for rehearing. See Petition for Rehearing for Appellee at 4-5, In re E.A.
Fretz Co., 565 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1978).
116. 565 F.2d at 372 n.19.
117. Id. at 374 n.22.
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tected. Outside the Fifth Circuit, courts should interpret the Code in
accordance with the sounder decisions in Industrial Packaging and
Cushman. These two cases, however, should not be interpreted even
outside the Fifth Circuit, as an unrestricted charter for floating secured parties. Some waters should and will remain off limits.
D. Code Limits
If the Fifth Circuit had not sunk the floating secured party in
Fretz, Revlon would have had priority over the Bank under section
9-312(5)(a), n 8 since both security interests were perfected by filing,
and Revlon filed first. 1 19 The priority of a floating secured party will
not be that clear in all cases.
Consider the following hypothetical case. In 1975, a debtor gave
a bank a security interest in equipment as collateral for a loan from
the bank, and appropriate financing statements naming the bank as
secured party were filed. In 1976, the debtor gave a finance company
a security interest in the same equipment as collateral for a loan from
the finance company, and appropriate financing statements naming
the finance company as secured party were filed. In 1977, the debtor
obtained a third loan from a wealthy, retired friend whose investments were being managed by the bank's trust department. The 1975
security agreement between the debtor and the bank was amended to
provide that the security interest would secure the loan from the
debtor's friend as well as the unpaid balance of the loan from the bank.
Under the Industrial Packaging decision and the priority rule of section 9-312(5)(a), the debtor's friend would have priority over the finance company. 120 It is important to consider whether that result
could have been reversed if the finance company had required the
debtor to use the procedure provided by section 9-208.
Section 9-208(1)121 provides that "[a] debtor may sign a statement indicating what he believes to be the aggregate amount of unpaid indebtedness as of a specified date and may send it to the
secured party with a request that the statement be approved or corrected and returned to the debtor." 122

Section 9-208(2)123 provides

118. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a).
119. 565 F.2d at 367-69. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a).
120. For a discussion of Industrial Packaging, see text accompanying notes 75-81 supra, See
U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a).
121. U.C.C. § 9-208(1).
122. Id.

123. Id. § 9-208(2).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1979

17

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 5 [1979], Art. 2
VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

24: p. 867

that the secured party must comply with that request within two
weeks, and that
[i]f the secured party without reasonable excuse fails to comply he
is liable for any loss caused to the debtor thereby; and if the debtor
has properly included in his request a good faith statement of the
obligation or a list of the collateral or both the secured party may
claim a security interest only as shown in the statement against
persons misled by his failure to comply. 124
While the bank in the hypothetical would have had no obligation to
respond to a direct inquiry by the finance company, the finance company could have required, as a condition to making the loan, that the
12 5
debtor initiate a section 9-208 inquiry.
In the hypothetical case above, let us suppose that in 1976 the
debtor sent the bank a correct 126 written statement of the amount
which the debtor owed the bank and requested that the statement be
approved or corrected and returned. If the bank had failed to respond
within two weeks, it would be able to "claim a security interest only
as shown in the statement against persons misled by . . . [its] failure
to comply."127 Alternatively, suppose that the bank made a timely
response to the debtor's request and approved the debtor's statement
of the amount due. Although section 9-208 does not explicitly state
the effect of a response by the bank, it could be interpreted as prohibiting the bank from claiming a broader security interest as against
2 8
persons misled by the response.'
Under either of these suppositions, however, the finance company has not been misled concerning the state of affairs which existed
when the bank received the written statement. It has been deceived
only if it were entitled to assume that there would be no subsequent
addition to the secured debt owed to the bank. Section 9-208 does
not by its terms limit the bank's priority as against the finance company to the state of affairs which existed when the bank received the

124. Id.
125. See id. § 9-208, Comment 2. See also First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Atlas Credit
Corp., 417 F.2d 1081, 1085 (10th Cir. 1969) (where bank filed financing statement covering
future advances, credit company permitted itself to be defrauded by failing to exercise the
opportunity to request information from bank before advancing money on same collateral).
126. If the debtor had understated the amount, § 9-208 would have had no effect on the
secured party's rights against third parties unless the debtor's understatement was made in good
faith. See 1 C. GILMORE, supra note 5, § 15.3, at 474-75.
127. U.C.C. § 9-208(2).
128. See id.
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written statement. 12 9 Moreover, nothing in section 9-312(5) 130 warrants imposing such a qualification on the first to file rule of priority.

131

The stated purpose of section 9-208 is to complement the Code's
system of notice filing by providing a procedure under which the secured party can be required "to disclose the complete state of affairs" 132 for the benefit of the debtor and "subsequent creditors and
purchasers." 133 Unfortunately, the procedure provides more questions than answers. A secured party may not be able to determine
whether any person has been misled by the secured party's response, or failure to respond, to the debtor's request under section

9-208. The debtor is not required to state the purpose of the request
or to inform the secured party if its response is disclosed to a third
party.134 It is also unclear whether a trustee in bankruptcy would be
able to assert the rights of a hypothetical creditor who might have
been misled. Whether a secured party must disclose that the security
agreement contains a provision for future advances is also unresolved. 135 Moreover, the effect of the secured party's overstatement
of the debt is not explained. The Code's failure to furnish answers to
any of these questions exposes section 9-208 as a severely defective
provision. One may suspect that it was casually conceived and issued
without the contemplation necessary to give it an effective form.
If the use of section 9-208 creates circumstances in which common law estoppel would apply, it may be appropriate to limit a secured party's priority. 13 6 Otherwise, section 9-208 should not be
treated as a qualification of the clearly stated priority rules of section
9-312. 17

129. Id. § 9-208.

130. Id. §9-312(5).
131. Id.
132. Id. § 9-402, Comment 2.
133. Id.

§ 9-208, Comment 2.

134. Id. § 9-208(1).
135. One commentator has asserted that the "existence of such clause need not be revealed"
in a response to a § 9-208 request. 5A BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE,
FORMS AND PROCEDURES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 92.59, at 9-152.2 (1974).
136. Cf. United States v. Cleaners & Farmers Coop. Elevator Co., 314 F. Supp. 1148, 1151
(N.D. Ind. 1970) (where county supervisor had informed manager of elevator company that
government had no lien on certain goods, government was estopped from asserting security

interest in those goods, even though it had previously perfected its security interest in them);
Ayers v. Yancey Bros., 141 Ga. App. 358, 361-62, 233 S.E.2d 471, 473-74 (1977) (trial court
must make finding of fact concerning defendant's contention that the secured party had verified
figures without any reference to the balance the secured party subsequently claimed it was
owed).
137. One commentator has suggested that § 9-208 "may be construed to exist completely
outside the priority rules." Cohen, The Future Advance Interest Under the Uniform Conuner-
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One other possible limitation under the Code can be considered
by supposing that in the hypothetical case an unsecured creditor obtained a judgment lien on the debtor's equipment before the debtor
obtained the third loan from his friend. Section 9-301(4)138 provides:
(4) A person who becomes a lien creditor while a security interest is perfected takes subject to the security interest only to the
extent that it secures advances made before he becomes a lien
creditor or within 45 days thereafter or made without knowledge of
the lien or pursuant to a commitment entered into without knowledge of the lien. 13 9
If the friend's loan were made more than forty-five days after the lien
arose and after the bank and the friend learned about it, the lien
creditor would have priority under section 9-301(4). The result should
be the same if either the bank or the friend knew about the lien,
140
since the knowledge of one should be attributed to the other.
E. Bankruptcy Limits
A new bankruptcy law, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
(Bankruptcy Reform Act) 141 became generally effective on October
1, 1979.142 It superseded the Bankruptcy Act, 14 3 which had been
cial Code: Validity and Priority, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1968). Although no
inquiry under § 9-208 was made in the Fretz case, the bankruptcy judge found that discussions
between the Bank and Revlon had taken place before the Bank obtained its security interest,
that the Bank had unsuccessfully attempted to get Revlon to subordinate its security interest in
favor of the Bank, and that Revlon had advised the Bank of "the total amount of the indebtedness secured by Revlon's security interests which included the indebtedness owed to Revlon
[and the Revlon subsidiaries]." Bankruptcy Judge's Findings of Fact, Nos. 11 and 12, quoted in
Brief for Appellee at 9-10, li re E.A. Fretz Co., 565 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1978). The bankruptcy
judge also found that the Bank had never directed an inquiry to Revlon's offices as to the
amount or nature of the debt secured by Revlon's security interest, but that other parties had
inquired and were advised that the security interests secured the indebtedness owed by Fretz
to the subsidiaries as well as to Revlon. Bankruptcy Judge's Findings of Fact, No. 13, quoted in
Brief for Appellee at 10, In re E.A. Fretz Co., 565 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1978). Those findings,
which the Bank (lid not challenge on appeal, demonstrate that the Bank was not misled and
thus would have had no basis for asserting that Revlon should be estopped from asserting its full
priority against the Bank.
138. U.C.C. § 9-301(4).
139. Id.
140. Section 9-301(4) was added when the 1972 Official Text was promulgated. Under the
1962 text of the Code, the priority of the lien creditor in the hypothetical case would depend on
whether the bank is considered to have a single security interest covering the friend's loan and
the bank's loan or a separate security interest for each. U.C.C. § 9-301 (1962 version). See notes
376-82 and accompanying text infra. Since the loans were made by different persons, the bank
should be viewed as having two separate security interests, in which case the lien creditor
would have the same priority under both the 1962 and 1972 text of the Code.
141. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C.A. (West Pamphlet 1979)).
142. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, § 402(a), Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2682.
143. Bankruptcy Act, §§ 1-703, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1976).
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amended many times since its enactment. This article will consider
the impact of the Bankruptcy Reform Act on floating parties and floating debt, using the Bankruptcy Act and decisions under it for guidance and illustration and, in some situations, for contrast.
The Fifth Circuit's discussion of the bankruptcy law in the Fretz
case, however, is not helpful in this connection.' 4 4 Since the court
proceeded from the premise that "the Revlon affiliates did not acquire a perfected security interest in the collateral when the FretzRevlon financing statement was filed," 145 its discussion of bankruptcy
law was directed only toward the "floating debt" problem raised by
the security agreement's provision concerning debt which Revlon
46
might later acquire by assignment.'
The First Circuit, on the other hand, analyzed the possible bankruptcy problems in the Cushman case, 147 with the expert assistance
of Professor Vern Countryman, who represented the trustee in bankruptcy.' 48 The court considered two lines of argument advanced by
the trustee. 149
The first theory was that the security interests were voidable
under the so-called "strong arm" provision, which gives a trustee the
status of a hypothetical lien creditor, 150 because the financing statement had the effect of "concealing a preference." 151 That reference
cannot be understood without elaborating upon the earlier statement
of the facts in Cushinan.152 Security interests which Cushman had
given to Bakers Management were perfected more than four months
before bankruptcy by the filing of financing statements naming Bakers
Management as secured party.' 53 Those security interests secured a
loan made by Bakers Management as intermediary for its affiliate,
Seaboard. 154 Upon receiving Bakers Management's $75,000 check
for the loan proceeds, Cushman immediately gave Seaboard a check
for $73,961.67 as payment for flour which Seaboard had earlier sold

144.
145.
146.
147.
supra.
148.

565
565
See
526

F.2d at 374-75. See text accompanying notes 35-38 supra.
F.2d at 374.
text accompanying note 487 infra.
F.2d at 30-37. For a discussion of Cushman, see notes 82-90 and accompanying text

526 F.2d at 25.

149. Id. at 27-34.

150. Bankruptcy Act, § 70(c), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1976). See also Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11
U.S.C.A. § 544 (West Pamphlet 1979).
151. 526 F.2d at 30 (emphasis supplied by the court).
152. See text accompanying notes 82-90 supra.
153. 526 F.2d at 26-27.
154. Id. at 25-26.
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to Cushman. 1 55 This payment would have been a voidable preference under section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act 156 if a bankruptcy peti1 57
tion had been filed against Cushman within the next four months.
The trustee maintained that the filing of financing statements
disclosing that Seaboard had an interest in the secured transaction
would have led other creditors to investigate Cushman's financial
situation, discover its insolvency, and file a bankruptcy petition in
time to void the transaction as a preference. 158 The Cushman court
observed that state law, not the bankruptcy law, governed the perfection requirements. 1 59 Since the security interests were perfected
under state law, they were valid even against a hypothetical lien creditor and therefore were not vulnerable to the trustee's strong arm
60
powers. '
. The trustee's second line of reasoning was that the security interests were invalid under section 67d(2)(d) of the Bankruptcy Act, 161
which made a transfer fraudulent if made "with actual intent as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud
either existing or future creditors." 162 In accepting that argument,
the bankruptcy judge stated that it was not necessary to consider
whether Cushman had actual fraudulent intent. 163 Instead, he relied
on the intent of Seaboard, whose unique position gave it the power to
control the disposition of Cushman's property. 164 The First Circuit
affirmed 165 the district court's reversal, however, on the ground that
"Seaboard clearly did not have such domination or control over
Cushman as to dispense with the necessity of proving that Cushman
actually intended to hinder, delay, or defraud its creditors." 166
The trustee had also relied on a line of cases holding that the
failure to record a mortgage constitutes fraudulent intent. 1 6 7 The

155. Id. at 26.
156. 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1976).
157. See id. The Bankruptcy Reform Act extends the period to one year with respect to
transferees who are "insiders," but reduces it to 90 days in all other cases. Bankruptcy Reform
Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 547 (West Pamphlet 1979).
158. 526 F.2d at 28.
159. Id. at 30.
160. Id.
161. 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(d) (1976). See 526 F.2d at 30.
162. 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(d) (1976). Substantially the same provision is contained in

§

548(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(1) (West Pamphlet 1979).
163. 526 F.2d at 31.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 34.

166. Id. at 31.
167. Id. at 33-34.
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First Circuit easily distinguished those cases, reasoning that the failure to record a mortgage enables the mortgagor to obtain further
credit on the basis of apparently unencumbered ownership of property and that the filing of financing statements naming Bakers Management as secured party had prevented that result in the Cushman
case.1 68 Moreover, the First Circuit noted that "the bankrupt's use of
a nominee as mortgagee has been held not to be even a badge of
fraud." 169
Having concluded that the Cushman transactions under consideration did not transgress any provision of the Bankruptcy Act, the
First Circuit addressed the apparent frustrations of the bankruptcy
judge, and perhaps counsel for the trustee, who must have recognized that the transactions were not literally proscribed by any provision of the Bankruptcy Act:
Although, as the district court noted, it may be wiser and
more progressive public policy to require full disclosure of potentially preferential secured transactions, neither the Maine UCC nor
the Federal Bankruptcy Act can be interpreted as adopting such a
policy. Any changes in these laws is a function for legislation. Accordingly, the district court's decision that the secured transactions
170
were properly perfected and not fraudulent is affirmed.
The First Circuit also noted that "[a] rule requiring the disclosure of
potentially preferential secured transactions would present problems
of its own." 171 The identification of all persons having an interest in
a secured transaction would not necessarily disclose a preference,
since there is no public record of a debtor's payment of antecedent
debt. 172
Moreover, potential preferences that do not involve secured
transactions would not be affected by a rule relating only to secured
transactions. It would be difficult to rationalize a rule which requires
the disclosure of potential preferences only when they are related to
secured transactions.' 73 There is no inherent difference in impact,
and it is unlikely that a survey of bankruptcy cases would establish
that preferences involving secured transactions are either more

168. Id. at 34.
169. Id., citing In re Locust Bldg. Co., 299 F. 756 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 265 U.S. 590
(1924).
170.
171.
172.
173.

526 F.2d at 34 (footnote omitted).
Id. n.12.
Id.
Id.
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numerous or greater in amount than those which involve simple
payments to creditors.
One must consider whether a rule requiring the disclosure of
potential preferences should be extended to cases of simple payments
to creditors. It must also be determined whether public disclosure of
all payments on account of antecedent debt should be required. If
not, one must then determine the circumstances under which disclosure should be required. The answers to these questions appear obvious when one contemplates the enormous burden which would be
imposed on creditors who attempted to comply with any such requirement. Creditors who chose to ignore it presumably would be
left without the benefit of the temporal limitation on their exposure
to the risk of having to return payments as preferences. 1 74 These
equally undesirable alternatives would probably lead to an increase in
demands for payment on delivery. Such a development would not be
welcomed by businessmen, each of whom is a creditor on some occasions, but a debtor on others. For these reasons, concern about concealed preferences is not a good starting point for an attack against
floating secured parties.
Alternatively, the security interest in Cushman might have been
set aside as a fraudulent transfer under section 67d(3) of the Bankruptcy Act 175 if a bankruptcy petition had been filed within four
months. That section makes a transfer fraudulent if: 1) it was made
within four months before the filing of a petition initiating a bankruptcy proceeding; 2) the transferor was then insolvent or was
thereby rendered insolvent; 3) the transferor was then contemplating
the filing of a petition initiating a bankruptcy proceeding or contemplating liquidation of all or the greater portion of the transferor's
property; 176 4) the transferor intended to use the consideration obtained for the transfer to enable any creditor of the transferor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the
same class; and 5) the transferee knew or believed, at the time of the
transfer, that the transferor intended to make such use of the consideration. 177

174. See Bankruptcy Act, § 60a, 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1976); Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11
U.S.C.A. § 547 (West Pamphlet 1979).

175. 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(3) (1976).
176. It is not necessary that the transferee knew that liquidation was contemplated. Steel
Structures, Inc. v. Star Mfg. Co., 466 F.2d 207, 214 (6th Cir. 1972). See 4 W. COLLIER,
BANKRUPTCY 67.38, at 554 (14th ed. 1978).
177. Bankruptcy Act, § 67d(3), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(3) (1976).
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The security interests in Cushman were not vulnerable under
either section 67d(2)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, 178 because the loan by
Bakers Management constituted fair consideration, 17 9 or section
67d(2)(d), because the trustee failed to prove actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud creditors.1 8 0 If the transaction had occurred within
four months before bankruptcy, however, neither the giving of fair
consideration by Bakers Management nor the trustee's inability to
prove actual fraudulent intent would have prevented the security in181
terests from being set aside pursuant to section 67d(3).
The bankruptcy judge found that Cushman intended to pay the
loan proceeds to Seaboard on account of antecedent indebtedness,
that Bakers Management knew of that intention, and that Cushman
was insolvent. 182 If bankruptcy had occurred within four months,
the only question under section 67d(3) would have been whether
Cushman was contemplating bankruptcy. 183 In that connection, the
trustee probably would have been aided by inferences arising from
objective facts to establish the necessary intent. As one author has
noted:
It may of course be argued that if a debtor intends to enable one
creditor to obtain a preferential advantage by virtue of a particular
payment, he must be contemplating liquidation rather than continuation and eventual solvency; and that one who knows or believes that the debtor has such an intent must also be cognizant of
his contemplation of liquidation

....

It is at least dubious, how-

ever, that a debtor who knows that he is or will become insolvent
when he makes a preferential payment to one or more of his creditors, should be permitted to contend that he nevertheless intended no preference because he expected to recover from his financial stringency. Such a contention was, at any rate, of doubtful
validity under former § 3a(2), which required an intent to prefer as
184
an element of the second act of bankruptcy.
178. Bankruptcy Act, § 67d(2)(a), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(a).
179. 526 F.2d at 32. Section 67d(2)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(a) (1976),
deems fraudulent as to creditors "every obligation incurred by a debtor within one year prior to
the filing of a [bankruptcy] petition" if the obligation is "incurred without fair consideration by a
debtor who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent, without regard to his actual intent." id.
180. 526 F.2d at 34. See note 162 and accompanying text supra.
181. For a discussion of this section, see notes 175-77 and accompanying text supra. See Steel
Structures, Inc. v. Star Mfg. Co., 466 F.2d 207, 213 (6th Cir. 1972). The Steel Structures court
observed that "under Sec. 67d(3) of the Bankruptcy Act, a finding of 'fraudulent intent' is not
required, nor is the question of 'fair consideration' or 'good faith' involved." Id.
182. lit re Cushman Bakery, 14 U.C.C. Rep. (Callaghan) 267, 274-75 (1). Me. 1974), revd,
16 U.C.C. Rep. (Callaghan) 897 (D. Me.), aff'd in part and revd in part, 526 F.2d 23 (1st Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 937 (1976).
183. See Bankruptcy Act, § 67d(3), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(3) (1976).
184. 4 W. COLLIER, supra note 176, 67.38, at 554 n.28b. (citations omitted).
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It would not have been necessary for the trustee to prove that the
payment to Seaboard was itself voidable under the preference provisions of bankruptcy law. 18 5 Accordingly, knowledge or belief on the
part of Seaboard or Bakers Management as to Cushman's insolvency
86
would not have been relevant.'

There is also another significant difference between the preference
and fraudulent transfer provisions of bankruptcy law. For purposes of
the preference provisions, a transfer of personal property is deemed
to have been made at the time it became perfected as against lien
creditors.187 For purposes of the fraudulent transfer provisions, a
transfer is deemed to have been made at the time it became perfected as against bona fide purchasers.188
Article 9 of the Code does not use the term "bona fide purchaser." Article 2189 on sales refers to a "good faith purchaser for
value." 190 Although the Code does not define that term as a whole,
a definition can be constructed from the separate definitions of its
parts. 19 1 Article 9 does use the term "buyer in ordinary course of
business,"' 192 which is defined by section 1-201(9) 193 as follows:
"Buyer in ordinary course of business" means a person who in
good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a third party in

the goods buys in ordinary course from a person in the business of
selling goods of that kind but does not include a pawnbroker .... Buying" may be for cash or by exchange of other
property or on secured or unsecured credit and includes receiving

185. This clearly was the intended effect of the 1952 revision of § 67d(3) of the Bankruptcy
Act. Act of July 7, 1952, Pub. L. No. 456, § 21(f), 66 Stat. 428 (current version at 11 U.S.C. §
107(d)(3) (1976)). The House Report reveals the rationale of the amendment: "If anything, the
estate needs greater protection in a case where the preference is not voidable, since the need
for pursuing the auxiliary transaction is more acute where the preferred creditor is invulnerable." H.R. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (citations omitted), reprinted in [1952]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1960, 1975.

186. See In re Cesari, 217 F.2d 424, 426-28 (7th Cir. 1954) (knowledge of bankrupt's insolvency not considered in determining the voidability of a transfer under § 67d(3) of the Bankruptcy Act).
187. Bankruptcy Act, § 60a(2), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2) (1976); Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11
U.S.C.A. § 547(e)(1)(B) (West Pamphlet 1979).
188. Bankruptcy Act, § 67d(5), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(5) (1976); Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11
U.S.C.A. § 548(d)(1) (West Pamphlet 1979).
189. U.C.C. art. 2.

190. Id. § 2-403(1).
191. See id. § 1-201(19) ("good faith"); id. § 1-201(33) ("purchaser"); id. § 1-201(44)(b)
("value").
192. For an example of the use of "buyer in ordinary course of business" in article 9, see id.
§ 9-301(1)(c).

193. Id. § 1-201(9).
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goods or documents of title under a pre-existing contract for sale
but does not include a transfer in bulk or as security for or in total
1 94
or partial satisfaction of a money debt.

Under section 9-307,195 a buyer in ordinary course of business 196
"takes free of a security interest . . . even though the buyer knows of
1 97
its existence" and even though it is perfected.
Since section 1-201(9) requires a purchase from "persons in the
business of selling goods of that kind," 198 the buyer in ordinary
course of business clearly is not as broad a concept as the good faith
purchaser.199 On the other hand, "bona fide purchaser," as used in
bankruptcy law, should be interpreted as including the narrower term
"buyer in ordinary course of business."
As a result of the fact that a security interest in goods held by a
debtor in the business of selling such goods, i.e., inventory, 20 0 can
20 1
never be perfected against a buyer in ordinary course of business,
it is not so perfected as of the date on which a bankruptcy petition is
filed against the debtor. Under the fraudulent transfer provisions of
bankruptcy law, the transfer is therefore deemed to have been made
immediately before the filing of the petition. 20 2 Consequently, a
security interest in inventory would always be vulnerable to a challenge under section 67d(3) of the Bankruptcy Act, even if financing
20 3
statements were filed more than four months before bankruptcy.

194. Id.
195. Id. § 9-307.
196. Id. § 9-307(1). A buyer of farm products from a person engaged in farming operations is
expressly excepted. 1d.
197. Id. See id. § 9-307, Comment 1.
198. id. § 1-201(9).
199. Atlas Auto Rental Corp. v. Weisberg, 54 Misc. 2d 168, 171, 281 N.Y.S.2d 400, 405
(Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1967). It has been suggested that a good faith purchaser who does not qualify as
a buyer in ordinary course of business may still "enjoy the protection of pre-Code common law
estoppel." Tumber v. Automation Design & Mfg. Corp., 130 N.J. Super. 5, 13, 324 A.2d 602,
606 (Law Div. 1974) (citations omitted). See Cohen, supra note 137, at 46 n.29.
200. Section 9-109(4) defines "inventory" as goods "held by a person who holds them for sale
or lease or to be furnished under contracts of service." U.C.C. § 9-109(4).
201. Id. § 9-307(1). See notes 195-97 and accompanying text supra.
202. Section 67d(5) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(5) (1976), provides:
For the purposes of this subdivision, a transfer shall be deemed to have been made at the
time when it became so far perfected that no bona fide purchaser from the debtor could
thereafter have acquired any rights in the property so transferred superior to the rights of
the transferee therein, but, if such transfer is not so perfected prior to the filing of the
petition initiating a proceeding under this title, it shall be deemed to have been made
immediately before the filing of such petition.
Id. See Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(d)(1) (West Pamphlet 1979).
203. See notes 175-77 and accompanying text supra. The security interests in Cushman
would have been subject to challenge on these grounds if the collateral had consisted of inven-
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Although the Bankruptcy Reform Act contains no precise counterpart to section 67d(3) of the Bankruptcy Act, in many cases a
transaction formerly voidable under that section will continue to be
voidable204 under the principle of Dean v. Davis. 205 In that case,
the United States Supreme Court stated:
Making a mortgage to secure an advance with which the insolvent
debtor intends to pay a preexisting debt does not necessarily imply
an intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors. The mortgage may
be made in the expectation that thereby the debtor will extricate
himself from a particular difficulty and be enabled to promote the
interest of all other creditors by continuing his business. The
lender who makes an advance for that purpose with full knowledge
of the facts may be acting in perfect "good faith." But where the
advance is made to enable the debtor to make a preferential payment with bankruptcy in contemplation, the transaction presents
an element upon which fraud may be predicated. The fact that the
money advanced is actually used to pay a debt does not necessarily
establish good faith. It is a question of fact in each case what the
20 6
intent was with which the loan was sought and made.
Despite the fact that section 67d(3) of the Bankruptcy Act was
based on Dean, the statutory language went beyond the facts of that
case and has been criticized for interfering with legitimate business
transactions. 20 7 One probable effect of eliminating section 67d(3) will
be a reversion to the standards of Dean, thus increasing the trustee's
burden of proof. The trustee will no longer be able to show merely
that the transferor himself contemplated liquidation, 20 8 but will need
to demonstrate that the parties shared a common purpose. 20 9 Nor

tory. The opinions in Cushman describe the collateral only as real and "personal property." 526
F.2d at 25. See text accompanying note 85 supra. The fact that all of the collateral, real and
personal, appears to have been covered by a single mortgage suggests that the personal property consisted of equipment.
204. COMM. ON THE BANKRUPTcY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT, PART U1, H.R.
Doc. No. 137, Part II, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 177 (1973) [hereinafter cited as BANKRUPTcY LAWS
COMM.

REPORT].

205. 242 U.S. 438 (1917).
206. Id. at 444. As one commentator has stated, the language in Dean "suggests that perhaps
the thought is that only transactions in which debtor and transferee have a common purpose to
effect a preference-amounting almost to a conspiracy-are fraudulent." Corker, Hazards of
Doing Business With An Insolvent: The Dean v. Davis Amendment in the Chandler Act, 1
STAN. L. REV. 189, 202 (1949).

207. See Spector & Feldman, Hidden Dangers In Financial Transactions With An Insolvent
Seller or Borrower: The Pitfall of Sec. 67d(3) of The Bankruptcy Act, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 264,
269-70 (1973). See also BANKRUPTCY LAWS COMM. REPORT, supra note 204, at 177.
208. See note 176 and accompanying text supra.
209. See note 206 and accompanying text supra.
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will the trustee any longer be able to rely on inferences arising from
objective facts in order to establish the necessary intent, x° but will
now probably be required to establish a subjective intent 2 l' approaching "actual fraud," 2 12 and a transaction may be upheld if it was
made in good faith with the reasonable expectation that the debtor
2 13
would thereby regain solvency.
Another possible basis for an attack on a floating secured party
by a bankruptcy trustee can be illustrated by the following hypothetical case. In 1975, a debtor gave a bank a security interest in the
debtor's accounts as collateral for a loan from the bank, and appropriate financing statements naming the bank as secured party were
filed. In 1976, the debtor, owing a substantial amount for raw materials which it had purchased on open account, agreed to secure that
debt by a second security interest in its accounts. The second security
interest was given to the bank as trustee for the finance company,
however, and no new financing statements were filed. Two months
later, a bankruptcy petition was filed against the debtor. Despite the
fact that the second security interest was perfected by a financing
statement filed more than ninety days before bankruptcy, it may be
vulnerable to an attack under section 547 of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act214 on the theory that the transfer resulting from the second se215
curity interest was made within ninety days before bankruptcy.
2 16
Under section 547(e),
a transfer of personal property is
deemed to have been perfected and made when no subsequent lien
on such property could become superior to the rights of the transferee. 2 17 The usual question under this section is whether a security
interest has been perfected, by filing or otherwise, more than ninety
days before bankruptcy, but that is- not the only possible question.
Filing the usual form of financing statement is not sufficient to create
2 18
an enforceable security interest.
210. See text accompanying notes 182-84 supra.
211. See Spector & Feldman, supra note 207, at 271-72.
212. Prior to the Bankruptcy Act, courts required "actual fraud" to invoke the rule of Dean.
See, e.g., Rittenberg v. Kaplan, 12 F.2d 95, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1925); Stone v. Allied Clothing
Corp., 140 N.J. Eq. 224, 236, 54 A.2d 625, 633 (Ch. 1947). See also Corker, supra note 206, at
208.
213. Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438, 444 (1917). See Corker, supra note 206, at 204-06.
214. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547 (West Pamphlet 1979).
215. See id.
216. Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 547(e)(1)(B), (2)(B) (West Pamphlet 1979). For
exceptions to this rule, see Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 547(e)(2)(A), (C) (West Pamphlet 1979).
217. Id.
218. American Card Co. v. H.M.H. Co., 97 R.I. 59, 62-63, 196 A.2d 150, 152 (1963) (financing statement containing debtor's signature and description of collateral but lacking actual
security agreement held insufficient to create enforceable security interest).
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Section 9-203(1) provides that "a security interest is not enforceable against the debtor or third parties" unless, inter alia, "the debtor
has signed a security agreement." 219 In the hypothetical case stated
above, the debtor signed two security agreements, one securing the
debt to the bank and the other securing the debt to the finance company. Although it might be argued that the first agreement satisfied
the literal requirement of section 9-203(1) that "a security agreement"
has been signed, the first agreement provided no security for the
debt to the finance company and would not have been enforceable for
that purpose. With regard to the security interest for the debt to the
finance company, section 9-203(1) should therefore be interpreted as
referring to the second security agreement. Since that security
agreement was signed by the debtor within four months before bankruptcy, the security interest can be avoided as a preference if the
trustee in bankruptcy can prove the other elements of a preference. 2 20 This analysis of the interaction between the Code and bankruptcy law's preference provisions is not, as it may first appear, in
conflict with the decisions upholding the floating lien. 22 1 In those
cases, the secured parties' claims were based on security agreements
signed before the preference period began.
As a practical matter, the preference provisions and the principle
of Dean provide a bankruptcy trustee with an effective means to sink
most floating secured parties who threaten to interfere with the equitable administration of bankruptcy estates. Those who do not pose
such a threat should be left beyond range of the trustee's artillery.
III.

FLOATING

DEBT

In prior discussions of the Fretz case, 22 2 Revlon was viewed as a
floating secured party, the holder of a security interest securing a debt
owed to another person. In this part of the article, Revlon will be
viewed as the holder of a security interest securing floating debt,
claims which it acquired after the execution of a security agreement
that expressly secured all debts "now existing or hereafter arising,
including without limitation any debt, liability or obligation owing

219. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(a).
220. The required knowledge or belief as to the debtor's insolvency could be that of either
the finance company or the bank as its agent. See 3 W. COLLIER, supra note 176, 60.55, at
1084-89.
221. See cases cited note 4 supra.
222. See notes 15-38 & 100-03 and accompanying text supra.
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from Debtor. . . to others which REVLON, INC ....
may have ob2 23
tained by assignment or otherwise."
Although the Fifth Circuit in Fretz noted that section 9-204 of
the Code 224 "clearly contemplates and sanctions . . . floating debt
(future advances),"225 it did not consider whether Revlon's claims
might have been upheld under that section.
A. Pre-Code Decisions
Professor Gilmore has observed that decisions under the common law and chattel mortgage statutes exhibited "an anxious undertone of distrust" about security arrangements covering future ad22 6
vances, although the arrangements were generally upheld.
Moreover, he noted that "thunderings of judicial wrath" were often
provoked by mortgages containing "dragnet" provisions. 2 27 The term
"dragnet" is used to describe a clause which provides that the collateral is to serve as security for all indebtedness of any sort which the
debtor may owe to the secured party at the time the agreement is
2 28
executed or at any time thereafter.
Some courts have restricted the effectiveness of such provisions
in real estate as well as chattel mortgages by applying a rule of construction which the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas stated as follows:
The "other indebtedness" secured by a mortgage may be
either antecedent or subsequent. Where it is antecedent, it must
be identified in clear terms, and where it is subsequent, it must
be of the same class as the primary obligation secured by the instrument and so related to it that the consent of the debtor to its
inclusion may be inferred. 229
Gilmore has quoted that statement with approval, referred to it as a
"rule of reason and good faith," and pronounced it "a fair summary of

223. In re E.A. Fretz Co., 565 F.2d 366, 368 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978) (emphasis omitted).
224. U.C.C. § 9-204.
225. 565 F.2d at 369.
226. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 5, § 35.1, at 917.
227. Id.
228. Id., § 35.2, at 917-18. The typical dragnet case about which the courts are concerned
involves a mortgage given to secure a small claim on the debtor's property. Id. at 918. The
mortgagee later extends additional credit which is covered by the dragnet clause. Id. In other
cases, the mortgagee subsequently purchases, probably at a discount, the mortgagor's other
debts and adds them to the mortgage debt by use of the dragnet clause. Id.
229. National Bank v. Blankenship, 177 F. Supp. 667, 673 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (citations omitted), aff'd sub noin. National Bank v. General Mills, Inc., 283 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1960).
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general, as well as Arkansas, law." 230 A more thorough examination
of the cases 2 31 demonstrates that Gilmore overstated matters.
In the first place, he failed to mention that several appellate
courts had rejected the proposition,2 32 sometimes called the "relatedness rule," that subsequent debt is not secured unless it is "of the
same class as the primary obligation." 2 33 Second the decisionmaking technique used in the dragnet cases is not worthy of Gilmore's
praise. Courts applying the relatedness rule professed to be ascertaining the intention of the parties to the mortgage. 2 34 The application
of the rule, however, frequently produced a result which defied evidence of the parties' intention, including the specific language in
which the intention was expressed. Such decisions provoked one
commentator to observe "that the courts may employ a great deal of
judicial discretion when professing to 'find the intention' " of the par5
ties. 23
An illustrative case is National Bank v. Blankenship, 23' the decision which produced the statement applauded by Gilmore. 23 7 In
Blankenship, a borrower had given a bank tlhree separate deeds of
trust, 23 8 each of which secured a different primary debt evidenced by
a specifically described note. 239 One deed of trust provided that it
also secured "any and all other indebtedness now or hereafter owing
by . . . [the borrower to the bank] whether evidenced by note, account, endorsement or otherwise." 240 The others contained similar
dragnet provisions. 24 1 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas had to decide whether each deed of trust
secured not only the note specifically described therein, but also the
notes specifically described in the other two deeds and nine other

230. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 5, § 35.3, at 920-21.

231. For a collection of many of the cases, see Annot., 172 A.L.R. 1079 (1948).
232. Hulsart v. Hooper, 274 F.2d 403, 406-07 (5th Cir. 1960) (applying Alabama law); First
Nat'l Bank v. Bain, 237 Ala. 580, 583-84, 188 So. 64, 66 (1939). For similar decisions after

Professor Gilmore's book was written, see Kenneally v. Standard Elecs. Corp., 364 F.2d 642,
647 (8th Cir. 1966) (applying Minnesota law); National Acceptance Co. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank,
101 Ill. App. 2d 396, 404-06, 243 N.E.2d 264, 268 (1968).
233. See text accompanying note 229 supra.
234. National Bank v. Blankenship, 177 F. Supp. 667, 673 (E.D. Ark. 1959), aff'd sub nol.
National Bank v. General Mills, Inc., 283 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1960).

235. Blackburn, Mortgages to Secure Future Advances, 21 Mo. L. REV. 209, 218 (1956).
236. 177 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Ark. 1959), aff'd sub norn. National Bank v. General Mills,
Inc., 283 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1960).
237. See text accompanying note 230 supra.
238. 177 F. Supp. at 669-71.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 670.

241. Id. at 669-70.
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notes evidencing loans to the borrower by the bank. 24 2 The bank's
witnesses testified that the loans had all been made for the purpose of
promoting the borrower's general welfare, and the borrower testified
that he understood that each piece of his property was security for
everything which he owed the bank. 243 Despite the testimony and
the comprehensive language of the dragnet provisions, the court held
that each deed of trust secured only the note specifically described
therein. 24 4 It is evident that the court was not ascertaining the intention of the parties, but for reasons of policy was resorting to a
"unique interpretation" 245 of the dragnet provisions in order to limit
them.
The judicial hostility to dragnet provisions clearly reflected a
suspicion that such provisions frequently were imposed on an unsuspecting debtor whose apparent assent was vitiated by his lack of actual awareness or understanding of the provision or by his disparate
bargaining power. 24 6 In other words, many of the dragnet decisions
were early attempts to deal with what are now labeled contracts of
247
adhesion or unconscionable contracts.
Although such decisions were based on sound intuition and
motivated by laudable purposes, the courts almost never used candid
analysis, relying instead on such covert tools 248 as rules of construction. 249 This usage of rules of construction to interfere with apparent
agreements has been described by Professor Karl Llewellyn as follows:

242. Id. at 669.
243. Id. at 674-75.
244. Id. at 674.

245. See Note, Unconscionable Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 109 U. PA.
L. REV. 401, 409 (1961) (warranty disclaimer provisions subjected to "unique interpretation" in

order to limit them).
246. See National Bank v. Blankenship, 177 F. Supp. 667, 673 (E.D. Ark. 1959), aff'd sub
nora. National Bank v. General Mills, Inc., 283 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1960); First v. Byrne, 238

Iowa 712, 715, 28 N.W.2d 509, 511 (1947); Corn Belt Savs. Bank v. Kriz, 207 Iowa 11, 18, 219
N.W. 503, 506 (1928).
247. For diverse views of unconscionable contracts, see Leff, U'nconscionability and the

Crowd-Consumers and the Common Law Tradition, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 349 (1970); Murray,
Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PiT'r. L. REV. 1 (1969); Rotkin, Standard Forms:
Legal Documents in Search of an Appropriate Body of Law, 1977 Amiz. ST. L.J. 599; Speidel,
Unconscionability, Assent ani Consumer Protection, 31 U. PrrT. L. REV. 359 (1970).
248. "Covert tools are never reliable tools." Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Em-

peror's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 559 (1967) (footnote omitted), quoting K.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAWV TRADITION 365 (1960).

249. See National Bank v. Blankenship, 177 F. Supp. 667, 673 (E.D. Ark. 1959), aff'd sub
norm. National Bank v. General Mills, Inc., 283 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1960); Bank of Searcy v.
Kroh, 195 Ark. 785, 789-90, 114 S.W.2d 26, 28 (1938); Henderson v. Farmers' Bank & Trust
Co., 189 Ark. 423, 431-34, 73 S.W.2d 725, 729 (1934).
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Hence in the main we have our interference case by case. And in
the main it moves by way of "construing" the particular language
in question not to have intended the result it did intend. Life insurance is perhaps the classic instance. This procedure saves the
lesser bargainor for the moment, and salves the court's conscience
both as to justice and as to policy. Yet a specious salving. Such
"construction" kills security in transactions, if "security" means
predictability of actions at law. No man is safe when language is to
250
be read in the teeth of its intent.
This process has produced varying results in the dragnet cases, as is
illustrated by a series of Texas decisions.
The first Texas case, Freiberg, Kline & Co. v. Magale,2 5 1 was
decided in 1888. In Freiberg, a debtor executed a chattel mortgage to
secure a specific debt arising from a sale of goods by the mortgagee,
but the mortgage also contained a dragnet provision. 25 2 Thereafter,
the mortgagee guaranteed a debt which the mortgagor owed to
another creditor.2 53 The mortgagee subsequently acquired the other
creditor's claim against the mortgagor. 254 The Supreme Court of
Texas held that the acquired debt was secured by the mortgage, stating:
The present mortgage provides for the securing of future
indebtedness. We do not think that the character of this indebtedness was limited. It was contemplated that debts should accrue by
reason of the sale of goods, but not from this cause alone. The
mortgage expressly provides that indebtedness of any kind shall be
secured by it. It then, to place the matter beyond doubt, provides
for debts to accrue in any other manner than had been already
stated. 255
When Wood v. Parker Square State Bank 256 reached the Texas
Court of Civil Appeals in 1965, the court relied on Freiberg as a
statement of the "recognized" Texas rule and held that a mortgage
with a dragnet provision secured a claim against the mortgagor which
25 7
the mortgagee subsequently acquired from another creditor.

250. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 732
(1931).
251. 70 Tex. 116, 7 S.W. 684 (1888).
252. Id. at 117, 7 S.W. at 685.

253. Id.
254. id.
255. Id. at 119, 7 S.W. at 686.
256. 390 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. Ct. App. 1965), rev'd, 400 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. 1966).
257. 390 S.W.2d at 836.
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During the same year, however, the Texas Supreme Court
changed course in Moss v. Hipp.2 5 s In that case, Falls obtained an
unsecured loan from Hipp and used the proceeds to make a down
payment on a tractor.2 5 9 Falls then borrowed the balance of the
purchase price from a bank. 260 The bank's loan was evidenced by
Falls' note, which Hipp guaranteed. 2 61 Falls also gave the bank a
chattel mortgage on the tractor as security for the bank's loan and
"any other indebtedness then or thereafter owing to the holder
of the
note." 262 When Falls later defaulted on his note to the bank, Hipp
purchased that note and the chattel mortgage from the bank. 2 63 Hipp
then claimed that the chattel mortgage also secured the loan which
he had made directly to Falls. 264 At trial, Falls testified that Hipp
and he had orally agreed that Hipp would pay the bank and that the
tractor would secure all of Falls' indebtedness to Hipp. 26 5 The trial
court considered Falls' testimony inconclusive, holding that the
mortgage did not secure Hipp's loan to Falls. 266 The court of civil
appeals reversed, 2 67 but it was in turn reversed by the Texas Supreme Court, which reasoned that dragnet provisions "apply only to
indebtedness which was reasonably within the contemplation of the
parties to the mortgage at the time it was made." 26" The court thus
maintained that the trial court's holding should not have been over26 9
turned.
In the following year, Wood v. Parker Square State Bank 270 was
appealed to the Texas Supreme Court, and the decision of the court
of civil appeals that the mortgage secured a claim against the mortgagor which the mortgagee subsequently acquired was reversed. 27 1
The supreme court cited Moss 272 and distinguished Freiberg on the
ground that the other debt in that case had been guaranteed by the
273
mortgagee who later acquired it.

258. 387 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1965).
259. Id. at 657.
260. Id.

261. Id.
262. Id.

263.
264.
265.
266.

Id.
Id.
Id.at 658 n.1.
Id. at 659-60.

267. Hipp v. Moss, 380 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. Ct. App. 1964), revd, 387 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1965).

268. 387 S.W.2d at 658 (citations omitted).
269. Id.

at 660.

270. 400 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. 1966).
271. Id. at 902. See text accompanying note 257 supra.

272. 400 S.W.2d at 901.
273. Id. at 900.
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The court of civil appeals followed the supreme court's analysis
in a 1967 decision, Finger Furniture Co. v. Chase Manhattan
Bank,2 74 which involved a chattel mortgage securing a specific debt
and "any other indebtedness for which any mortgagor herein may be
or hereafter becomes liable to mortgagee." 275 Citing Moss, the court
held that the dragnet provision did not secure an otherwise unmentioned debt which the mortgagor owed to the mortgagee at the time
2 76
the mortgage was executed.
Three years later, the Texas Supreme Court changed course
again in Estes v. Republic National Bank.2 7 7 The issue before the
court was the extent to which a series of notes was covered by a deed
of trust securing a specific note and "all other indebtedness, of whatever kind or character, owing or which may hereafter become owing"
by the debtor to the creditor. 278 Some of the notes were already
outstanding when the deed of trust was executed, and some were
issued subsequently. 279 The Estes court held that all were secured
by the deed of trust and that parol evidence was not admissible for
the purpose of restricting the broad terms of the dragnet provision. 2 80 The supreme court's earlier decision in Wood was never
mentioned.
Despite the labyrinthine course taken by the Texas Supreme
Court, it is possible to reconcile the Texas decisions. It is apparent
that a dragnet provision will be held to cover other debt arising directly from transactions between the debtor and the original secured
party, whether the other debt arose before or after the creation of the
security interest. 28 l

A dragnet provision will not be held to cover

other debt arising from a claim which the original secured party acquires from another creditor 2 82 unless the claim is based on an obli-

274. 413 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. Ct. App. 1967).
275. Id. at 134.
276. Id.
277. 462 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. 1970).

278. Id. at 274 (emphasis omitted).
279. Id. at 275.
280. Id. at 276.

281. Estes v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 462 S.W.2d 273, 275-76 (Tex. 1970). See Kimbell Foods,
Inc. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 557 F.2d 491, 495 (5th Cir. 1977), aff'd on other grounds sub noma.
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 99 S. Ct. 1448 (1978). Contra, Finger Furniture Co. v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 413 S.W.2d 131, 134 (Tex. Ct. App. 1967).

282. Wood v. Parker Square State Bank, 400 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. 1966). It has been suggested,
however, that "the peculiar facts in the Wood decision and the fact that it preceded the Estes
decision strongly suggest that an attorney representing a borrower or a purchaser of land encumbered by a 'dragnet' mortgage might well ignore the former case entirely." Wallenstein &
St. Claire, Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 28, 53 n.214 (1976).
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gation of the debtor which the secured party has guaranteed. 2s3 In
no case will a dragnet provision cover other debt to an assignee of the
original secured party even if the assignee has guaranteed the obliga2 84
tion specifically secured by the security agreement.
While this analysis may represent an accurate statement of Texas
law, it is subject to criticism since it consists of a series of almost
mechanical rules which bear little relation to the language of the instruments to which they apply or the actual intention of the parties to
those instruments. Moreover, some of these rules are inconsistent
285
with decisions in other jurisdictions.
B. The Code Provisions
Section 9-204(3) of the Code provides: "Obligations covered by a
security agreement may include ruture advances or other value
whether or not the advances or value are given pursuant to commitment (subsection (1) of Section 9-105)."286 The intent of this section
is explained in a comment as follows:
Under subsection (3) collateral may secure future as well as
present advances when the security agreement so provides. At

common law and under chattel mortgage statutes there seems to
have been a vaguely articulated prejudice against future advance
agreements comparable to the prejudice against after-acquired
property interests. Although only a very few jurisdictions went to

the length of invalidating interests claimed by virtue of future advances, judicial limitations severely restricted the usefulness of
such arrangements. A common limitation was that an interest
claimed in collateral existing at the time the security transaction

was entered into for advances made thereafter was good only to
the extent that the original security agreement specified the

amount of such later advances and even the times at which they
should be made. In line with the policy of this Article toward
after-acquired property interests this subsection validates the future advance interest, provided only that the obligation be covered
2
by the security agreement.

87

283. Freiberg, Kline & Co. v. Magale, 70 Tex. 116, 119, 7 S.W. 684, 686 (1888).
284. Moss v. Hipp, 387 S.W.2d 656, 658-70 (Tex. 1964).
285. See Price v. Williams, 179 Ark. 12, 18-19, 13 S.W.2d 822, 824 (1929) (dragnet provision
covers other debt to assignee of mortgage); First Nat'l Bank v. Byard, 26 N.J. Eq. 255, 256-57
(Ch. 1875) (dragnet provision covers other debt acquired by mortgagee); Strong Hardware Co.
v. Gonyow, 105 Vt. 415, 419-20, 168 A. 547, 548 (1933) (dragnet provision covers other debt to
assignee of mortgage which arose after assignment but not other debt previously acquired by
assignee).

286. U.C.C. § 9-204(3).
287. Id. § 9-204, Comment 5.
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This comment is in accord with Professor Gilmore's description of the
hostility with which courts dealt with future advance agreements
under the common law and chattel mortgage statutes, 28 8 and it
clearly indicates that section 9-204(3) was intended to eliminate preCode limitations "provided ... that the obligation be covered by the
security agreement." 28 9 The only requirement is that the security
agreement must adequately describe the obligations, including "fu2 90
ture advances or other value," which are intended to be secured.
Whether or not that requirement has been satisfied should be determined by reading and interpreting the security agreement.
To that extent, the Code's approach is consistent with that used
in the pre-Code cases in which the courts purported to look for the
intention of the parties to mortgages containing dragnet provisions. 2 9 1 There is, however, no basis in the text of or comments to
section 9-204(3) for assuming that the Code was intended to perpetuate any of the arbitrary rules which some courts applied in the
pre-Code cases. It is surprising, therefore, to find Gilmore asserting
that arbitrary limits can be read into section 9-204(3).292 A full quotation of his assertion is appropriate in view of its impact on the judicial treatment of section 9-204(3):
However "covered by the security agreement" is to be read, §
9-204(5) should certainly not be taken to overrule, the so-called
"dragnet" cases under pre-Code law. Legitimate future advance arrangements are validated under the Code, as indeed they generally
were under pre-Code law. This useful device can, however, be
abused; it is abused when a lender, relying on a broadly drafted

clause, seeks to bring within the shelter of his security arrangement claims against the debtor which are unrelated to the course
of financing that was contemplated by the parties. In the dragnet
cases, the courts have regularly curbed such abuses: no matter how

the clause is drafted, the future advances, to be covered, must "be
of the same class as the primary obligation . . .and so related to it
that the consent of the debtor to its inclusion may be inferred."

The same tests of "similarity" and "relatedness," vague but useful,
should be applied to § 9-204(5).
As under pre-Code law, the secured party must assume that
there is a limiting point which all the drafting skill in the world

288. See text accompanying note 227 supra.
289. U.C.C. § 9-204, Comment 5.

290. Id. § 9-204(3). For a discussion of what is meant by advances, see notes 398-407 and
accompanying text infra.
291. See notes 226-85 and accompanying text infra.
292. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 5, § 35.5, at 932.
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will not overpass. The courts will disallow, as they have in the
293
past, outrageous claims.
Gilmore's view raises problems under section 1-102,294 the general construction section of the Code, which states that the Code's
purposes are to simplify, clarify, modernize, and unify the law. 29 5 As
demonstrated in the preceding section of this article, the relatedness
rule favored by Gilmore was not uniformly followed under pre-Code
law. 2 96 Accordingly, the survival of that rule in jurisdictions which
did follow it will to that extent defeat the Code's objective of uniformity. 2 97 In addition, the application of the pre-Code rules of construction frequently defeated the apparent intentions of the parties
and produced varying results which are not easily rationalized. 2 9 To
the extent that the complex and confusing pre-Code rules are deemed
to have survived the adoption of the Code, the law governing secured
transactions surely will not have been simplified, clarified, and modernized.
One other section of the Code must be considered, although
Gilmore did not cite it in support of his view that the relatedness rule
survived the enactment of the Code. Underlying the relatedness test
is the fear that a dragnet clause could be used abusively by a creditor. 299 With respect to contracts for the sale of goods, this concern
is codified in the doctrine of unconscionability, found in section
2-302, 3 0 0 which provides:

(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it
was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable

clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall

293. Id. (footnotes omitted). In the above quotation, Gilmore refers to § 9-204(5) of the 1962
official text of the Code, which is identical to § 9-204(3) of the current text except for the
addition of a cross reference added for purposes of clarity.
294. U.C.C. § 1-102.
295. Id.
296. See notes 232 & 233 and accompanying text supra.
297. The relatedness rule has survived under the Code. See, e.g., In re Eshelman, 10
U.C.C. Rep. (Callaghan) 750, 753 (E.D. Pa. 1972); John Miller Supply Co. v. Western State
Bank, 55 Wis. 2d 385, 394, 199 N.W.2d 161, 165 (1972). For a discussion of the continued
adherence to Gilmore's relatedness doctrine, see notes 308-55 and accompanying text infra.
298. See notes 234-85 and accompanying text supra.
299. See text accompanying note 293 supra.
300. U.C.C. § 2-302.
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be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its
commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making
30 1
the determination.
302
Although that section does not apply to secured transactions,
several courts have cited it as a source of principles to be used in
30 3
dealing with unconscionable provisions in security agreements.
Those principles can thus be utilized to invalidate unconscionable
30 4
dragnet provisions in appropriate cases.
The unconscionability policy embodied in section 2-302, how-

ever, clearly cannot sustain the relatedness rule. Subsection (2)305

directs a court to consider evidence of "commercial setting, purpose
30 6
and effect" in determining whether a clause is unconscionable.
Furthermore, a comment to section 2-302 explicitly rejects the prior
30 7
practice of using rules of construction to deal with such clauses.
None of the decisions discussed in the next section of this article
cited section 2-302 or the principles which it embodies, and none
resulted from the type of explicit determination of unconscionability
required by section 2-302.
C. Decisions Under the Code

Although Professor Gilmore believes that the relatedness rule
survives the enactment of the Code, several decisions indicate that
not all of the courts concur with his conclusion. The first reported
case in which the relatedness rule might have been applied to a
dragnet provision in a Code security agreerhent was In re Midas Coin
Co. ,308 decided in 1967. Without any discussion of the point, the
301. Id.
302. See, e.g., In re Advance Printing & Litho Co., 277 F. Supp. 101, 105 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd
per curiam, 387 F.2d 952 (3d Cir. 1967); Hernandez v. S.I.C. Fin. Co., 79 N.M. 673, 675, 448
P.2d 474, 476 (1968). For a discussion criticizing the Hernandez decision, see Comment, Unconscionable Security Agreements: Applications of Section 2-302 to Article 9, 11 B.C. INDUS. &
COM. L. REV. 128 (1969).

303. Tinsman v. Moline Beneficial Fin. Co., 531 F.2d 815, 818 n.5 (7th Cir. 1976); In re
Johnson, 13 U.C.C. Rep. (Callaghan) 953, 957 (D. Neb. 1973); In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253
F. Supp. 864, 873 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 125, 232 A.2d 405, 418 (1967).
304. Conversely, one court has held that a security agreement will not be treated as unconscionable if it reflects "a negotiated arm's length business transaction between sophisticated
commercial parties." Interstate Security Police, Inc. v. Citizens & S. Emory Bank, 237 Ga. 37,
38, 226 S.E.2d 583, 584 (1976).
305. U.C.C. § 2-302(2).
306. Id.
307. Id. § 2-302, Comment 1.
308. 264 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Mo. 1967), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Zuke v. St. John's
Community Bank, 387 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1968). The disputed issue was whether the collateral,
a coin collection, was money or goods. 264 F. Supp. at 195. The district court held that it was
goods and that the security interest was perfected by possession. Id. at 199.
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United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
stated that the security agreement covered not only the primary debt,
a note, but also an overdraft in the debtor's bank account with the
30 9
secured party.
In a 1969 decision, South County Sand & Gravel Co. v.
Bituminous Pavers Co. ,310 the Rhode Island Supreme Court expressly
held that a security agreement with a broad dragnet provision covered not only the primary debt, notes, but also the debtor's liability
as an endorser of other notes held by the secured party and its liability for an overdraft in its bank account with the secured party. 3 1
The court did not mention the relatedness rule in its decision. In the
same year, however, a bankruptcy referee accepted Gilmore's view
that the relatedness rule remains valid under the Code, but held that
the "other debt" in the case before it was sufficiently related to the
primary debt to be covered by the dragnet provision in the security
3 12
agreement.
In re Zwicker, 3 13 decided in 1971, also dealt with a claim for
overdrafts in a bank account. 3 14 In that case, a bankruptcy court
held that the overdraft claim was covered by the dragnet provision in
the security agreement, although the primary debt, a loan, had been
paid before the debtor became bankrupt. 3 15 The court acknowledged
that it was "undisputed that the parties did not contemplate at the
time the loan was made that overdrafts would take place." 3 16 The
court did not mention the relatedness rule, relying instead upon the
3 17
continuing indebtedness of the debtor to the bank.
Professor Gilmore's views, however, were fully vindicated in two
1972 decisions. In John Miller Supply Co. v. Western State Bank, 318
the issue was whether a security agreement covering "all Debtor's
present and future debts, obligations and liabilities to . . . [the se-

309. 264 F. Supp. at 194.
310. 106 R.I. 178, 256 A.2d 514 (1969).
311. Id. at 184, 256 A.2d at 518.. The court characterized the language of the security agreement as "'all-encoinpassing." Id.
312. In re White Plumbing & Heating Co., 6 U.C.C. Rep. (Callaghan) 467, 470 (E.D. Tenn.

1969). The dragnet clause was included in the terms of a security agreement executed for the
purchase of a truck in 1965. Id. at 468-69. The subsequent obligations were a cash loan and a
second truck loan,both made in 1968. Id. at 468. The court made no analysis of the relatedness
of these transactions. See id. at 470.
313. 8 U.C.C. Rep. (Callaghan) 924 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
314. Id. at 925.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 925-27. The court also noted the failure of the debtor to demand a release of the
security interest upon payment of the note. Id. at 927.
318. 55 Wis. 2d 385, 199 N.W.2d 161 (1972).
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cured party], of whatever nature" secured the primary debt, a note,
and also the debtor's liability for damages under a contemporaneous
contract which gave the secured party an exclusive agency to sell the
debtor's products. 3 19 The court cited an earlier decision in which it
had "recognized the desirability" of future advance provisions but had
also "pointed out that such documents would be closely scrutinized
and would be enforced only to the extent that the future transactions
or liabilities sought to be secured were in the clear contemplation of
the parties."320 The court then quoted extensively from Gilmore's
discussion of dragnet clauses,3 2 1 mentioned his approval of the relatedness rule, and cited his conclusion "that the same rationale
should be applied in the interpretation of transactions arising under
the Code." 322 Applying those "generally accepted rules," the court
concluded that the debtor's liability under the agency contract was
"not within the clear contemplation and intent of the parties" and
"not of the same nature or related to the types of indebtedness involved in the original financing agreement." 3 23 Accordingly, the
court held that the liability under the agency contract was not secured. 324
In another 1972 decision, In re Eshelman,3 25 a security agreement covering an automobile secured the note evidencing the purchase price of the automobile and also "all other liabilities of Debtor
to Lender, now existing or hereafter incurred." 3 2 6 When the debtor
became bankrupt, it owed a small balance of the purchase price of
the automobile and a larger balance of a note evidencing a loan which
it had later obtained from the secured party.3 27 The Eshelman court
held that the later loan was not secured since it was so unrelated to
the first loan "as to negate the inference that the debtor consented to
its inclusion." 3 2 8 Although the court cited Gilmore for the proposi329
tion that the relatedness rule survived the enactment of the Code,

319. Id. at 388-90, 199 N.W.2d at 162-63.
320. Id. at 392, 199 N.W.2d at 164, citing Capocasa v. First Nat'l Bank, 36 Wis. 2d 714, 154
N.W.2d 271 (1967).
321. 55 Wis. 2d at 392-94, 199 N.W.2d at 164-65, quoting 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 5,
§ 35.5, at 931-32.
322. 55 Wis. 2d at 394, 199 N.W.2d at 165, citing 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 5, § 35.2, at
920.
323. 55 Wis. 2d at 394, 199 N.W.2d at 165.
324. Id.
325. 10 U.C.C. Rep. (Callaghan) 750 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
326. Id. at 751.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 753.
329. Id. at 752, citing 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 5, § 35.5, at 932.
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the court cited no authority that the rule had ever been followed in
Pennsylvania, the state whose law should have been applied to the
case. 330

In the same year, however, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit decided In re Riss Tanning Corp.,331 which
held that a dragnet provision in a security agreement for a note and
chattel mortgage also covered the debtor's contemporaneous obligation under a real estate mortgage to the secured party. 332 Observing
that New York courts had for many years construed such provisions
liberally, the Second Circuit stated: "We should neither interpret
away the obvious meaning of the words involved nor supply addi333
tional meanings to them."
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Tenth
3 34
Circuits followed that view in 1973. In re Public Leasing Corp.
dealt with a series of agreements, each securing a note for the purchase of a vehicle and "any and all liabilities ... [of the debtor to the
secured party] now existing or hereafter incurred." 335 Applying Oklahoma law, the Tenth Circuit held that each agreement secured all
of the notes. 3 36 Although application of the relatedness rule might
have produced the same result, the court did not utilize it, 33 7 but
rather cited a "general rule that where the terms of a contract are
clear and unambiguous there is no reason to resort to rules of construction." 338 In In re Iredale's Ltd., 339 the Ninth Circuit reversed
a district court decision which had "failed to give effect to the expressed intentions of the parties" when it held that a dragnet provi34 0
sion did not cover an equipment lease.
330. See Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 512-13 (1960) (determination of taxpayer's
interest in property is governed by state law); In re Cushman Bakery, 526 F.2d 23, 30 (lst Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 937 (1976) (whether a security interest has been perfected against
bankruptcy trustee is exclusively a question of state law); Kenneally v. Standard Elecs. Corp.,
364 F.2d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 1966) (state law controls in determining validity of chattel mortgage
provision in mortgagor's bankruptcy proceeding).

331. 468 F.2d 1211 (2d Cir. 1972).
332. Id. at 1213.

333. Id. (citation omitted). Because the security agreement unambiguously stated that the
chattel secured the note as well as any other obligation "whether now existing or hereafter
arising," the court concluded that "the chattel mortgage, by virtue of its 'dragnet' clause, stood
as additional security for the then 'existing' obligation" of the loan covered by the real estate
mortgage. Id.
334. 488 F.2d 1369 (10th Cir. 1973).
335. Id. at 1375.
336. Id at 1378.
337. The security agreements all concerned the conditional sale of trailers and trucking
equipment in the context of a continuing business relationship. Id. at 1374-75.

338. Id. at 1377-78.
339. 476 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
340. Id. at 939.
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The next three decisions provided further evidence of the conflict concerning dragnet provisions. In one, the court accepted Gilmore's view that the relatedness rule remains valid under the Code,
although it held that the "other debt" in the case before it was sufficiently related to the primary debt to be covered by the dragnet provision in the security agreement. 34 1 In the second, the court did not
even mention the relatedness rule in holding that a security agreement covered not only the primary debt, the purchase price of an
automobile, but also a debt for the purchase price of an organ. 342 In
the third, the court cited the relatedness rule in holding that an
agreement securing loans and "any other obligations of the debtor to
the secured party" did not cover overdrafts in the debtor's checking
34 3
account.
The issue reached the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in 1977 in Kinibell Foods, Inc. v. Republic National
Bank. 344 The security agreement in that case stated that it secured a
note and "all other indebtedness at any time hereafter owing" by the
debtor to the secured party. 34 5 The issue before the court was
whether the agreement secured an open account debt for inventory
sold by the secured party to the debtor. 34 6 The district court held
that the open account debt was not secured because it was not of the
same nature as the primary debt. 3 47 Citing several of the Texas decisions discussed above, the district court expressed the conviction that
a Texas court would reach the same conclusion.3 48

341. Marine Nat'l Bank v. Airco, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
342. Malloy v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 139 Ga. App. 798, 229 S.E.2d 678 (1978).
343. Community Bank v. Jones, 278 Or. 647, 665-66, 566 P.2d 470, 481-82 (1977). Other
courts faced with dragnet clauses and bank overdrafts have held that the overdrafts were covered by the dragnet clause. See In re Midas Coin Co., 264 F. Supp. 193, 194 (E.D. Mo. 1967),
aff'd per curiam sub norn. Zuke v. St. John's Community Bank, 387 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1968);
South County Sand & Gravel Co. v. Bituminous Pavers Co., 106 R.I. 178, 184, 256 A.2d 514,
518 (1969).
344. 557 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1977), aff(d on other grounds sub non. United States v. Kimbell
Foods, Inc., 99 S. Ct. 1448 (1978).
345. 557 F.2d at 493.
346. Id. at 493-94.

347. Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 401 F. Supp. 316, 325-26 (N.D. Tex.
1975), rev'd, 557 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1977), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v.
Kimbell Foods, Inc., 99 S. Ct. 1448 (1978).
348. 401 F. Supp. at 325, citing Wood v. Parker Square State Bank, 400 S.W.2d 898 (Tex.
1966); Moss v. Hipp, 387 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1965); Finger Furniture Co. v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 413 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. Ct. App. 1967). Although the district court did not cite Estes v.
Republic Nat'l Bank, 462 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. 1970), the Fifth Circuit cited Estes for the proposition that future advances clauses are valid. 557 F.2d at 495. For an in depth discussion of Texas
law regarding future advances clauses, see notes 251-85 and accompanying text supra. The district court also relied on non-Texas law for the proposition that the relatedness rule controlled
future advances clauses. 401 F. Supp. at 325, citing 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 5, § 35.5, at
931-33; In re Eshelman, 10 U.C.C. Rep. (Callaghan) 750 (E.D. Pa. 1972); National Bank v.
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The Fifth Circuit reversed, 349 stating that the district court had
correctly interpreted Texas law but had applied it incorrectly. 350 That
characterization of the district court's opinion cannot be taken literally, however, since the Fifth Circuit proceeded to state the Texas
rule without any reference to a relatedness test. 35 1 The court asserted that the rule is simply that in order to be secured, the other
debt must have been "reasonably within the contemplation of the
parties" 35 2 and that "a further extension of credit to the debtor by
the lender is deemed future indebtedness reasonably contemplated
by the parties when they execute a future advance clause." 3 53 The
Fifth Circuit observed that the district court had violated the parol
evidence rule by admitting testimony relating to the subjective intention of the parties when they executed the security agreement and
that it had compounded that "error by failing to consider the truest
test of the parties' intention, the words of the contract clearly providing that the security agreement should cover future indebtedness." 354
In a very similar case, the Connecticut Superior Court more recently gave full effect to a dragnet provision, reasoning: "The strict
construction of the so-called 'dragnet clause' in security agreements
may have its proper place in appropriate equity proceedings . ..but
it clearly should not apply to security interests under the Uniform
355
Commercial Code."
These last two decisions may indicate the demise of the relatedness rule preferred by Gilmore and the wider acceptance of a process
of interpretation which is more consistent with the spirit and letter of
the Code. It is likely, however, that the ghost of relatedness will
survive to compete with the spirit of the Code.
D. Drafting Considerations
Draftsmen of security agreements may be able to hasten the demise of the relatedness rule by following the lesson of a 1972 decision
Blankenship, 177 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Ark. 159), aff'd sub nom. National Bank v. General
Mills, Inc., 283 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1960); John Miller Supply Co. v. Western State Bank, 55
Wis. 2d 385, 199 N.W.2d 161 (1972).
349. 557 F.2d at 505.
350. Id. at 495.
351. See id.
352. Id. at 495, quoting Wood v. Parker Square State Bank, 400 S.W.2d 898, 901 (Tex.
1966).
353. 557 F.2d at 495.
354. Id. at 496.
355. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Community Banking Co., 35 Conn. Supp. 73, _,395 A.2d
727, 729 (Super. Ct. 1978) (citation omitted). Chrysler Credit, like Kimbell, concerned the
applicability of a future advances clause to an open inventory account after the original
indebtedness had been paid. Id. at _,
395 A.2d at 727-28.
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involving real estate, In re Dorsey Electric Supply Co. 3 56 In that
case, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas refused to apply Arkansas' firmly entrenched relatedness rule
to a deed of trust which expressly provided that it secured all other
indebtedness, "whether or not the same shall be similar or dissimilar
35 7
or related or unrelated to the primary indebtedness."
Nonetheless, the abolition of the relatedness rule will not always
save the careless draftsman. For example, the omission of any time
reference from a dragnet provision may exclude subsequently arising
debt from its coverage 358 or at least create an ambiguity which raises
an issue of fact. 3 59 Similar problems would arise if a debtor's liability
as an endorser or a surety is claimed to be secured under a dragnet
clause which does not mention secondary and contingent liabilities.
E. Debt Acquired by Assignment
Even the most skilled and careful draftsman may not be able to
pilot one kind of floating debt, that acquired by assignment, past a
lingering vestige of the relatedness rule. A consideration of this point
will bring us back to the Fretz case.
In Kimbell Foods, 360 the Fifth Circuit noted with approval that
"in Texas a future advance clause in a mortgage does not secure a
subsequent debt from the debtor to a third party acquired by the
mortgagee." 3 6 1 This point has since been underscored by Thorp
Sales Corp. v. Dolese Brothers Co., 36 2 which dealt with an installment sale agreement covering vehicles and providing that the vehicles secured not only their purchase price but also "all of Buyer's
future debts, obligations and liabilities of whatever nature to Seller or
Seller's assignee." 363 The same buyer and a different seller entered
into a second installment sale agreement covering other vehicles, and

356. 344 F. Supp. 1171 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
357. Id.at 1175 (emphasis supplied by the court) (footnote omitted). The court noted that the
"same class" rule would have applied if the language of the clause had not been so unambiguous. Id.
358. See Texas Kenworth Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 564 P.2d 222, 224-26 (Okla. 1977).
359. See Barksdale v. Peoples Fin. Corp., 393 F. Supp. 112, 120 (N.D. Ga. 1975), aff'd sub
nora. McDaniel v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 578 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1978).
360. For a discussion of Kimbell Foods, see notes 344-54 and accompanying text supra.
361. 557 F.2d at 495 (citation omitted). See also First Nat'l Bank v. Rozelle, 493 F.2d 1196,
1202 n.3 (10th Cir. 1974); In re White Plumbing & Heating Co., 6 U.C.C. Rep. (Callaghan)
467, 470 (E.D. Tenn. 1969). The White Plumbing court held that the "other debt" was secured
but emphasized that it had not been "bought up by the bank to become sheltered under its
security agreement." Id.

362. 453 F. Supp. 196 (W.D. Okla. 1978).
363. Id. at 198.
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both agreements were eventually assigned to the plaintiff.36 4 The
United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma
held that the buyer's debt under the second agreement was not secured by the vehicles covered by the first agreement, 36 5 concluding
that the language of the dragnet clause was "unclear and ambiguous."

36 6

After citing Gilmore and decisions applying the relatedness rule,
the Thorp court asserted:
The Court is convinced by the numerous cases cited by the
plaintiff, that it is no longer necessary, as between the original
lender and the original debtor, for future advances to be of the
Clauses such as that insame class as the primary obligation ....
volved here are valid to include in the security agreement all other
debts of whatever class or character created between the original
parties. All of these cases involved additional advances of value by
the original lender to the original debtor. None of these cases involved an assignee of the original lender purchasing an obligation
of the original debtor from a third party.367
The court did not hold that no dragnet provision should ever be held
to cover debt subsequently acquired by the secured party, but held
only that the language of the first agreement under consideration was
"not sufficient to enable the plaintiff to purchase the second agreement from . . . [the seller] and have that indebtedness secured by his
36 8 It
security interest in" the vehicles covered by the first agreement.
is unresolved whether the court would have reached a different conclusion if the first agreement had expressly covered, for example,
"debts of the buyer which the seller or the seller's assignee may
hereafter acquire by assignment or otherwise," a paraphrasing of the
language used in the security agreement considered in the Fretz case.
Although the Fifth Circuit's dictum in Kimbell Foods, quoted
above, 3 69 suggests that such language would not lead it to a different
conclusion, that court ignored an opportunity to address the question
directly in Fretz.
The Fretz case provides an almost ideal set of facts for a lawyer
trying to construct a case which would be most likely to produce a
364. Id. at 196-97.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 199.
367. Id. at 200 (citations omitted).
368. Id.
369. See note 361 and accompanying text supra. The Kimbell Foods court emphasized the
fact that the future advances clause in question concerned obligations between the original
debtor and creditor. 557 F.2d at 495.
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decision that acquired debt can be covered by a dragnet provision.
The security agreement was clear and unambiguous, 3 70 explicitly covered debt which Revlon might acquire by assignment, 37 1 and even
expressed an intention to include debt to Revlon's subsidiaries, the
very creditors from which the assigned debt was subsequently acquired by Revlon. 37 2 Those provisions should have satisfied any
court which truly attempted to ascertain the intention of the parties. 37 3 Nevertheless, although the Fifth Circuit made a passing reference to the concept of floating debt, 374 it did not consider the possible application of that concept to the Fretz case.
F. Policy Considerations
Setting aside questions of interpretation and conscionability,
there remains an issue of whether, as a matter of policy, dragnet
provisions should be permitted to include debt acquired by assignment. The issue can be identified by assuming the replacement of
section 9-204(3) of the Code by a rule limiting the coverage of any
security agreement to debt which exists when the security agreement
is executed. In other words, a secured party would need to obtain a
new security agreement, or an amendment to an existing agreement,
each time it extended new credit to the debtor. A secured party
would not be prevented from obtaining security for obligations arising
from its transactions directly with the debtor. It could simply refuse
to enter into a transaction unless the debtor executed the necessary
security agreement, which he would be willing to do in order to obtain the additional credit. Under this analysis, the hypothetical rule
would cause inconvenience and expense for both parties without producing any benefit for either of them.
The hypothetical rule would interfere in a more significant way
with a secured party's ability to obtain security for debt acquired by
assignment. In some cases, the debtor may have an interest in substituting one creditor for another in order to obtain some forebearance, and the prospective assignee could then insist on a new security

370. See 565 F.2d at 368 n.2.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 368.
373. The "'reasonable contemplation" of the parties test is controlling in the Fifth Circuit. See
text accompanying notes 352 & 353 supra. One commentator has suggested "foreseeability" and
"specific intent" tests as a substitute for the relatedness rule. Note, Future Advances Financing
Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Curbing the Abuses of the Dragnet Clause, 34 U. PITT.
L. REV. 691, 698 (1973). The agreement in Fretz should satisfy even this restrictive test.
374. 565 F.2d at 369.
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agreement as a condition to acquiring the debt. With the exception of
those cases, a debtor would have no incentive for executing a new
security agreement covering acquired debt because the transaction
would produce no new benefit to the debtor. In many cases, therefore, the hypothetical rule would serve the interests of debtors by
protecting them from the consequences of an agreement that debt
subsequently acquired by assignment will be secured.
Nevertheless, an absolute rule that dragnet provisions will not be
permitted to catch debt acquired by assignment is not justified because it would be inconsistent with the explicit Code policy of freedoma of contract. 375 In appropriate circumstances, however, a court
might conclude that a dragnet provision is unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable to the extent that it covers debt subsequently acquired by assignment. An explicit determination of that kind would
be consistent with the policies expressed in the Code.
Another problem is whether the debtor's other creditors should
be protected from the consequences of the debtor's agreement that
debt subsequently acquired by assignment will be secured. If a secured party is permitted to acquire previously unsecured claims
against the debtor and convert them to secured debt under a dragnet
provision in an earlier security agreement, the relative rights of other
creditors in a distribution of the debtor's assets may be altered. Although that is an appropriate matter for concern, invalidating a dragnet provision is not an appropriate remedy. Instead, the interests of
other creditors should be protected by the applicable priority rules
and insolvency laws.
G. Priorities
Consider the following hypothetical case. In March, a debtor
executed an agreement giving its principal inventory supplier a security interest in the debtor's equipment as collateral for the balance
which the debtor then owed to the supplier and for all other indebtedness of the debtor to the supplier which might thereafter arise.
The supplier filed appropriate financing statements. In April, the
debtor executed an agreement giving a bank a security interest in the
same equipment as collateral for a loan, and the bank filed appropriate financing statements. Early in May, an unsecured creditor obtained a judgment lien on the equipment. Until the supplier learned
about the lien in June, it continued making weekly shipments of in-

375. U.C.C. § 1-102, Comment 2.
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ventory to the debtor without receiving any payments. What are the
relative priorities of the supplier, the bank, and the lien creditor?
The 1962 Official Text of the Article 9 of the Code did not deal
expressly with the priority of future advances, and the problem has
provoked considerable debate. 376 Two different methods of analysis
have emerged from that debate. One view is that the supplier in the
hypothetical case has a single security interest which secures a
number of extensions of credit. 3 77

The consequence of that position

is that, under the 1962 text of the Code, the supplier has full priority
over the bank under the first to file rule of section 9-312(5)(a) 3 7 8 and
379
over the lien creditor under section 9-301(1)(b).
The other approach is that the supplier has a separate security
interest for each extension of credit. 380 The consequence of this view
is that, under the same sections of the 1962 text, the supplier has full
priority over the bank38 but has priority over the lien creditor only

376. E.g., 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 5, § 35.6, at 937-39; 1A SECURED TRANSACTIONS,
supra note 96, § 15.09[3], at 1606-08; Cohen, supra note 137 at 11-36; King, Future Advances
Under the U.C.C. and the Intervening Judicial Lien Creditor, 74 CoM. L.J. 61 (1969); Comment, Priority of Future Advances Lending Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 35 U. CHI.
L. REV. 128 (1967).
377. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 5, § 35.6, at 938-39.
378. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1962 version). The 1962 version provided that "priority between
conflicting security interests in the same collateral shall be determined . . . in the order of filing

if both are perfected by filing, regardless of which security interest attached first under Section
9-204(1) and whether it attached before or after filing." Id. Accord, Kimbell Foods, Inc. v.
Republic Nat'l Bank, 557 F.2d 491, 497-98, 503-05 (5th Cir. 1977), aff'd sub nora. United States
v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 99 S. Ct. 1448 (1978) (single security interest rule applied under both
,
state and federal law); Associated Business Inv. Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 264 Ark. 611,
573 S.W.2d 328, 330 (1978) (subsequent loans had priority over intervening security interests
since they were covered by a future advances clause in a preceding mortgage, even though
original note had been paid); Thorp Fin. Corp. v. Ken Hodgins & Sons, 73 Mich. App. 428,
436, 251 N.W.2d 614, 618 (1977) (bank which lent money under a future advances clause and
incorporated by reference the security agreement into the second loan had priority over an
intervening perfected secured transaction made by a finance company); Index Store Fixture Co.
v. Farmer's Trust Co., 536 S.W.2d 902, 905-06 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (party with first filed
security interest had priority over later security interest even though the subsequent transactions between the original creditor and debtor were not pursuant to a future advances clause).
379. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1962 version). The 1962 version provided that "an unperfected
security interest is subordinate to the rights of. . .a person who becomes a lien creditor without knowledge of.the security interest and before it is perfected." Id. See Estate of Cook, 64
Cal. App. 3d 852, 864-67, 135 Cal. Rptr. 96, 102-04 (1976) (applying New York law to hold that
future advances under perfected security interest has priority over intervening judgment creditor); Friedlander v. Adelphi Mfg. Co., 5 U.C.C. Rep. (Callaghan) 7, 10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968)
(security interest attaches and is perfected upon the initial advance).
380. See 1A SECURED TRANSACTIONS, supra note 96, § 15.09[3], at 1606-08; Comment,

supra note 376, at 137-39.
381. See U.C.C. § 9-312, Example 1 (1962 version). It has been suggested that the first
creditor may not have absolute priority unless the advances were obligatory. See IA SECURED
TRANSACTIONS, supra note 96, § 15.09[3], at 1606-08; Marine Midland Bank-E. Nat'l Ass'n v.
Conerty Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 77 Misc. 2d 311, 317-18, 352 N.Y.S.2d 953, 961-62 (Sup. Ct.
1974).
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with respect to the price of inventory shipped to the debtor before
382
the lien creditor obtained its lien.
The 1972 Official Text deals with the priority problem directly in
section 9-312(7),383 which provides:
(7) If future advances are made while a security interest is
perfected by filing or the taking of possession, the security interest
has the same priority for the purposes of subsection (5) with respect to the future advances as it does with respect to the first
advance. If a commitment is made before or while the security
interest is so perfected, the security interest has the same priority
with respect to advances made pursuant thereto. In other cases a
perfected security interest has priority from the date the advance is
38 4
made.
Applying this provision, the supplier in the hypothetical case has full
priority over the bank regardless of whether the supplier's security
3 5
interest had been perfected by possession or by filing.
With respect to lien creditors, section 9-301(4) of the 1972
text 3s6 provides:
(4) A person who becomes a lien creditor while a security interest is perfected takes subject to the security interest only to the
extent that it secures advances made before he becomes a lien
creditor or within 45 days thereafter or made without knowledge of
the lien or pursuant to a commitment entered into without knowl38 7
edge of the lien.

Under this provision, the supplier in the hypothetical case has priority over the lien creditor with respect to the price of inventory
shipped to the debtor before the levy was made or within forty-five
days thereafter, even if it had learned about the lien immediately
after it was obtained. 3 8 The supplier would have priority for ship-

382. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1962 version). Even under the separate security interest view, the
supplier would have priority over the lien creditor if the supplier had been legally obligated to
deliver inventory to the debtor after the lien creditor obtained its lien. Marine Midland BankE. Nat'l Ass'n v. Conerty Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 77 Misc. 2d 311, 317-18, 352 N.Y.S.2d 953,
961-62 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
383. U.C.C. § 9-312(7).
384. Id.
385. On the other hand, the last sentence of § 9-312(7) provides that a security interest
temporarily perfected, under U.C.C. § 9-304(4) or U.C.C. § 9-304(5), without either filing or
possession has priority only from the date an advance is made. Id. § 9-312(7).
386. Id. § 9-301(4).
387. Id.
388. Id. The text of § 9-301(4) is not as clear as it might be. Standing alone, it could be
interpeted as cutting off the priority of a secured party who has knowledge of a lien, even if the
45-day period has not yet expired. Comment 7 to § 9-301, id. § 9-301, Comment 7, however,
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ments made after the forty-five day period expired when it had knowledge of the lien only if it were legally obligated to make the shipments pursuant to a commitment given without knowledge of the
lien.
Since the 1972 text of Article 9 was not adopted in Texas until
1973,389 section 9-312(7) of the 1972 text could not have been applied
in the Fretz case. Under either view of the 1962 text, however, the
first to file rule would have given Revlon full priority over the Bank if
the Fifth Circuit had considered the dragnet provision effective with
39 0
respect to the debt acquired by Revlon from its subsidiaries.
Whether or not the Code would have given Revlon's claim on
the acquired debt priority over the bankruptcy trustee in Fretz is a
different matter. A bankruptcy trustee is a lien creditor under the
Code's definition of that term. 3 9 1 If Revlon were viewed as having a
single security interest, the 1962 text of the Code would have given
its claim priority over lien creditors, including a bankruptcy
trustee.3 9 2 To the extent that the single security interest approach
reflects a policy designed to promote secured future advances lending
for the benefit of debtors,3 93 however, Revlon's claim is unappealing
because its acquisition of its subsidiaries' claims did not benefit
Fretz. 394 If Revlon were viewed as having a separate security interest for the acquired debt, its claim would not have had priority
3 95
under the 1962 text.

states emphatically that the secured party's priority "is made absolute for 45 days regardless of
knowledge of the secured party concerning the judgment lien." Id.In comparison, the contrasting language of U.C.C. § 9-307(3) provides that a buyer who is not a buyer in the ordinary
course of business "takes free of a security interest to the extent that it secures future advances
made -after the secured party acquires knowledge of the purchase, or more than 45 days after
the purchase, whichever first occurs." Id. The 45-day rule is designed to protect the secured
party under the similar rule of § 6323(c)(2) and § 6323(d) of the Internal Revenue Code, I.R.C.
§§6323(c)(2), (d), as amended by the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80
Stat. 1125 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 28, 40 U.S.C.). See U.C.C. § 9-301, Comment 7.
389. Uniform Commercial Code, ch. 400, § 5, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 999 (codified at TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, §§ 9.101-.507) (effective Jan. 1, 1974).
390. The Bank could not have changed this result by requiring Fretz to use the procedure
provided by § 9-208. See notes 121-37 and accompanying text supra.
391. U.C.C. § 9-301(3).
392. See notes 377-79 and accompanying text supra.
393. See Comment, supra note 376, at 139-44. This commentator finds this argument more
compelling in the situation where future advances occur frequently. Id. at 143. Conversely,
proponents of the separate security interest view maintain that the single security interest
theory restricts the debtor to one source of credit. Id. at 145-46.
394. In fact, Revlon acquired the subsidiaries' claims after Fretz filed its voluntary petition in
bankruptcy. 565 F.2d at 366. It is difficult to see the benefit Fretz could have obtained from
this assignment. For a discussion of debt acquired by assignment and its relationship to the
debtor's interest, see notes 360-74 and accompanying text supra.
395. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1962 version).
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If the 1972 text of the Code were applicable, it could be argued
that Revlon had priority under section 9-301(4), since it acquired the
debt within forty-five days after Fretz filed its petition and the trustee
in bankruptcy was appointed. 396 One problem with that argument is
that section 9-301(4) limits the secured party's priority to "advances
made" within the forty-five day period. 39 7 That language is narrower
than the provision in section 9-204(3), which states that an agreement
may secure "future advances or other value." 3 98 This language raises
the question of whether the failure to refer to "other value" in section
9-301(4) has any significance. Another problem is the meaning of "advances." Neither the comments to section 9-301(4) nor the stated
reasons for its addition to the 1972 text provide an answer to these
questions.
The term advances "does not have a fixed and single meaning." 399 Although it is sometimes used as a synonym for loans, the
context may require a broader interpretation. 400 For example, one
court has held that advances, as used in a chattel mortgage statute,
includes a seller's extension of credit for the purchase price of
goods 4 0 but another court has held that it does not have that mean40 2
ing in the context of a factor's lien statute.
In defining a purchase money security interest, section
9-107(b) 40 3 uses the language "making advances or incurring an obligation." 4 04 Both that definition and section 9-204(3) indicate that the
draftsmen of the Code used the term advances in a somewhat restricted sense and support an argument that, as in section 9-301(4),
the term is limited to loans of money.
On the other hand, there is no discernible policy reason for
employing such a narrow interpretation in section 9-301(4). If a bank
obtains a security interest in a borrower's equipment as collateral for
future loans of money to enable the borrower to purchase fuel, section 9-301(4) clearly protects the bank. If a fuel supplier obtains a
security interest in the same equipment for future deliveries of oil,
the supplier should not be denied similar protection. Protecting both
the supplier and the lender serves the policy of promoting future
40 5
extensions of credit for the benefit of debtors.
396.
397.
398.
399.

See 565 F.2d at 368.
U.C.C. § 9-301(4).
Id. § 9-204(3) (emphasis added).
Continental Oil Co. v. Pauley Petroleum, Inc., 251 A.2d 824, 826 (Del. 1969).

400. Id.

401. Timmer v. Talbot, 13 F. Supp. 666, 669 (W.D. Mich. 1935).
402. In re Freeman, 294 F.2d 126, 132 (3d Cir. 1961).
403. U.C.C. § 9-107(b).

404. Id.
405. See Comment, supra note 376, at 139-44.
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That policy, however, does not support a rule which would give
a secured party priority over a lien creditor with respect to a claim
arising from a future transaction which produces no new benefit for
the debtor. 40 6 This suggests that an appropriate interpretation of advances in section 9-301(4) is one which includes all direct extensions
of credit, whether in the form of loans or otherwise, but not the
acquisition of a pre-existing claim. 40 7 Under such an interpretation,
section 9-301(4) would not have given Revlon priority over the trustee
in Fretz.
So far as the Code is involved, those were the possibilities in the
Fretz case. Even if Revlon's claim had priority over the trustee under
the Code, however, Revlon still would have had to contend with the
Bankruptcy Act.
H. Floating Debt in Bankruptcy
Fretz's trustee might have argued that Revlon's security interest
was a voidable preference to the extent that it secured the claims
assigned to Revlon by its subsidiaries. Under section 547(b) of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act, 40 8 a voidable preference is a "transfer" of a
debtor's property "to or for the benefit of a creditor. . .for or on
account of an antecedent debt" 40 9 which is "made while the debtor
was insolvent" 4 10 and "on or within 90 days before"' 4 11 the filing by
or against the debtor of a petition initiating a bankruptcy proceeding
if the effect of the transfer will be to enable the creditor to obtain a
greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the same
class. 4 12 Under section 101(40)413 the creation of a security interest
41 4
or other lien is a transfer.
In Fretz, the key question would have been whether the transfer
occurred within the preference period. Under the preference provisions, a transfer of personal property is deemed to have been per406. This is exactly what occurred in Fretz. See note 394 and accompanying text supra.

407. See Fedders Fin. Corp. v. Chiarelli Bros., 221 Pa. Super. Ct. 224, 228, 289 A.2d 169,
171 (1972) (lender provided advances to borrower within U.C.C. § 9-107(b) when it provided
new money, as distinguished from pre-existing claim or antecedent debt); U.C.C. § 9-107,

Comment 2 (excluding from the definition of a purchase money security interest any security
interest taken as security for or in satisfaction of a pre-existing claim or antecedent debt).
408. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b) (West Pamphlet 1979).
409. Id.
547(b)(1)-(2).
410. Id. § 547(b)(3).
411. Id. § 547(b)(4)(A). The period is extended to one year with respect to transferees who
are "insiders." Id. § 547(b)(4)(B).
412. Id. § 547(b)(5). The test was substantially the same under § 60a of the Bankruptcy Act,
11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1976).
413. Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(40) (West Pamphlet 1979).
414. Id.
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fected and made when it became so far perfected that no creditor on
a simple contract can acquire a judicial lien that is superior to the
interest of the transferee. 4 15 That standard appears to consist of two
separate elements: 1) perfection of the transfer; and 2) the priority of
the transferee.
With some limited exceptions, 4 16 perfection of a Code security
interest is accomplished by filing financing statements or by taking
possession. 4 17 In Fretz, Revlon's financing statements had been filed
more than four months before the bankruptcy proceeding began. 4 18
In addition, however, a security interest is not perfected until it has
"1attached," a term used in the Code to describe the point at
which
property becomes subject to a security interest. 4 19 Attachment occurs when three requirements have been met. 420 First, there must
be a security agreement, which must be in writing unless the collateral is in the possession of the secured party or its agent. 4 21 Second,
value must have been given. 4 22 Third, the debtor must have rights
4 23
in the collateral.
In Fretz, the first requirement clearly had been met more than
four months before bankruptcy .when Fretz executed a security
agreement with a dragnet provision. 424 While the Fretz opinion does
not indicate whether any of the collateral was acquired by Fretz within
four months before bankruptcy, the floating lien decisions had made
that question irrelevant for the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act's
preference provisions. 425 Those decisions, which held that security
interests in after acquired property are not voidable as preferences
merely because the debtor's rights in such property were acquired

415. Id. §§ 547(e)(1)(B), (e)(2). The test was substantially the same under § 60a(2) of the
Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2) (1976).

416. See U.C.C. §§ 9-304(4), (5).
417. Id. §§ 9-302, 9-304, 9-305.
418. 565 F.2d at 368.
419. U.C.C. § 9-303 & Comment 1.
420. Id. § 9-203(1).
421. Id. § 9-203(1)(a).
422. Id. § 9-203(1)(b).
423. Id. § 9-203(1)(c).
424. See 565 F.2d at 367.
425. See Biggins v. Southwest Bank, 490 F.2d 1304, 1309-10 (9th Cir. 1973) (after acquired
property was sufficiently described in financing statement so that subsequent lien creditors,
including the bankruptcy trustee, would have notice); DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277,
1286-88 (9th Cir. 1969) (secured party filing security agreement covering accounts receivable
before four month avoidance period had priority over trustee in bankruptcy who asserted claim
for accounts arising during the four month period); Grain Merchants of Ind., Inc. v. Union Bank
& Sav. Co., 408 F.2d 209, 213-15 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 827 (1969) (filing of security
agreement covering after acquired property served as record notice and entitled the secured
creditor to priority over a subsequent lien creditor).
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within four months before bankruptcy, have been reversed by section
547(e)(3) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 4 26 which explicitly provides
that for preference purposes "a transfer is not made until the debtor
42 7
has acquired rights in the property transferred."
The other requirement for attachment remaining to be considered is a determination of when value was given. It is clear that, by
extending credit directly to Fretz, Revlon had given some value more
than four months before the petition was filed. 42 8 It is necessary to
consider whether that was adequate to perfect the security interest as
collateral for all of Revlon's claims, including those obtained later by
assignment.
The assignments to Revlon by its subsidiaries could be considered as the significant events, and they occurred after the bankruptcy
petition was filed. 4 29 Any transfer which is not perfected prior to the
filing of a bankruptcy petition is deemed to have been made immediately before the petition was filed.4 3 0 Accordingly, if the assignments were treated as the final step in the process of perfection,
Revlon's security interest would be voidable. Conversely, if the required value must have been given to the -debtor, the date of the
assignments to Revlon would be irrelevant, and it would be appropriate to determine when the subsidiaries extended credit to Fretz.
A decision by the Fifth Circuit, In re King-Porter Co.,43 1 provides some guidance with respect to this question. In that case, an
appliance distributor held a security interest in a dealer's inventory. 43 2 A security agreement containing a dragnet provision had
been executed on February 14; the distributor had given some value
by shipping appliances to the dealer on February 17; and appropriate
financing statements had been filed by February 25.4 33 On March
28, a manufacturer shipped 112 air conditioners to the dealer on open
account, and on April 15 the distributor acquired that account from

426. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(e)(3) (West Pamphlet 1979).

427. Id. The impact of that change upon secured parties has been mitigated by the adoption
of the improvement of position rule in § 547(c)(5). Id. § 547(c)(5). The rule is used to determine
the extent to which a security interest in after acquired inventory or accounts may be avoided.

In effect, -[a] creditor with a security interest in a floating mass, such as inventory or accounts
receivable, is subject to preference attack to the extent he improves his position during the
90-day period before bankruptcy." S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5874.
428. See 565 F.2d at 367-68.
429. Id. at 368.
430. Bankruptcy Act, § 60a(2), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2) (1976); Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11
U.S.C.A. § 547(e)(2)(c) (West Pamphlet 1979).
431. 446 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1971).
432. Id. at 725.
433. Id.
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the manufacturer when they entered into a distributorship agreement. 4 34 On May 31, the distributor repossessed 101 of the 112
units. 435
On June 5, the dealer filed a bankruptcy petition.4 3 6 The distributor sought to reclaim the remaining eleven units, and the trustee
counterclaimed for the value of the other 101 units. 437 The bank438
ruptcy judge denied reclamation and granted the counterclaim.
The district court affirmed on the grounds that the creation of a security interest in the air conditioners was both a voidable preference
4 39
and a fraudulent transfer.
The Fifth Circuit reversed, 440 holding that the distributor had
given value on February 17 and that its security interest in the air
conditioners was perfected shortly after March 28, when the dealer
received the units. 441 Moreover, it held that the transfer occurred
even earlier.4 4 2 Citing the floating lien cases, the Fifth Circuit stated
that, for the purposes of section 60a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, 443 a
transfer "is equated with the act by which priority over later creditors
is achieved and not with the event which attaches or perfects the
security interest in a specific item of property." 4 44 The court
therefore maintained that the transfer occurred when the distributor
completed its filing on February 25, 4 45 and the dealer's debt to the
manufacturer was not antecedent to the transfer since it arose after
February 25.446
The floating lien decisions have been criticized on the ground,
among others, that they avoid the Code's provisions that a security
interest cannot attach until the debtor has rights in the collateral and
cannot be perfected until it has attached. 44 7 Nevertheless, in King-

434. Id.
435. Id. at 726.

436. Id.
437. Id. at 725.

438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id.

at 727.
at 725.
at 727.

442. Id. at 730.
443. 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2) (1976).
444. 446 F.2d at 730, citing DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277, 1287 (9th Cir. 1969).
445. 446 F.2d at 730.

446. Id. at 732. The holding in King-Porter has been described as follows: "A party ...

can

convert what would have been a preferential security transfer if made to him into a non-

preferential transfer merely by assigning his own claim to another party who has a security
interest in assets of the common debtor .....
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 24-5, at 883 (1972).
447. U.C.C. §§ 9-203(1)(c), 9-303(1). For an example of this criticism, see Countryman, supra

note 5, at 275.
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Porter, the Fifth Circuit has extended the floating lien decisions by
similarly avoiding the Code's provision that a security interest cannot
attach until value is given 448 and ignoring the criticism by boldly
asserting that bankruptcy law and the Code employ different concepts
449
of perfection.
In a brief criticism of King-Porter, Professor Kennedy concedes
that the distributor's security interest in the air conditioners "appears
to be sustainable as a security interest for future advances" to the
extent that it secured "obligations arising out of credit extensions by
the distributor." 4 50 That concession apparently is based on the floating lien decisions, but Professor Kennedy obviously disagrees with
the Fifth Circuit's extension of those decisions. He observes that the
dealer's unsecured obligation to pay the manufacturer for the 112 air
conditioners arose at least eighteen days before the transaction by
which it became a secured debt to the distributor, thereby suggesting
not only that the giving of value should be considered relevant for the
purpose of bankruptcy law's preference provisions, but also that the
significant event for that purpose in King-Porter was the distributor's
acquisition of the manufacturer's claim against the dealer. 4 51 Professor Kennedy concludes that the King-Porter decision "suggests all ingenious way for emasculating the preference policy of the Bankruptcy
Act. If a secured party under an agreement that contains a dragnet
clause can acquire unsecured claims against the debtor on the eve of
bankruptcy, the possibilities of exploitation are patent." 452
Professor Kennedy's ultimate conclusion must be conceded, but
the question is whether there is a basis for distinguishing between
the secured party's direct extensions of credit, which should be protected, and its acquisition of unsecured claims during the preference
period, which should be denied protection. The King-Porter decision
was a logical extension of the floating lien decisions. If one of the
Code's conditions of attachment, that the debtor have rights in the
collateral, was to be ignored for the purposes of section 60a of the
Bankruptcy Act, there was no meaningful analytical basis for insisting
on compliance with another of the conditions, that value be given.
Moreover, even if the court had not extended the floating lien decisions in King-Porter, the Fifth Circuit should have considered the
448. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(b).
449. See 446 F.2d at 730. A district court has characterized King-Porter as holding that perfection under bankruptcy law is "not synonymous" with perfection under the Code. Owen v.
McKesson & Robbins Drug Co., 349 F. Supp. 1327, 1331 (N.D. Fla. 1972).
450. Kennedy, Secured Transactions, 27 Bus. LAw. 755, 770 (1972).
451. Id.

452. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol24/iss5/2

58

Justice: Secured Transactions - What Floats Can Be Sunk

1978-1979]

SECURED TRANSACTIONS

distributor's security interest for the acquired debt perfected by the
value given when the distributor initially extended credit to the
4 53
dealer.
There is, however, another possible basis for distinguishing between direct extensions of credit and acquired claims. The bankruptcy law's preference provisions do not simply provide that a
transfer is deemed to have been made when perfected. They require
that the transfer be so far perfected that no subsequent lien obtainable by a creditor on a simple contract could become superior to the
interest of the transferee.4 54 The preceding section of this article
considered the relative priorities of a secured party and a lien creditor. 45 5 As indicated, section 9-301(4) of the 1972 text of the Code
clearly gives the secured party priority with respect to credit extended directly to the debtor before or within forty-five days after a
lien arises, but that section probably should be interpreted as giving
the lien creditor priority to the extent that the security interest covers claims subsequently acquired by the secured party.4 5 6 Under the
1962 text, the result depends on which of two conflicting approaches
is adopted. 45 7 If the Fifth Circuit had considered this question in
King-Porter, it could have relied on decisions supporting the single
security interest view of the 1962 text, under which the initial extension of credit gives the secured party full priority over a subsequent
458
lien creditor.
Although the preference provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act purport to provide a trustee with a tool specifically intended to
reverse the King-Porter decision, 4 59 the text appears to fall short of
the avowed objective. Under section 54 7 (e)(3), the creation of the
security interest in the air conditioners would not be deemed a transfer until the debtor "acquired rights in" the units,4 60 which presumably occurred when the units were shipped by the manufacturer on

453. See cases cited note 378 supra. It is possible to argue that in the same manner that the

filing of a financing statement secures any advances thereafter made by the creditor, the initial
extension of credit also perfects the security interest for the acquired debt.
454. Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(e)(1)(B) (West Pamphlet 1979); Bankruptcy
Act, § 60a(2), 11 U.S.C. § 96a(2) (1976).
455. See notes 376-407 and accompanying text supra.
456. See notes 396-407 and accompanying text supra.
457. See notes 376-82 and accompanying text supra.
458. See cases cited note 379 supra.
459. See S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1978), reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5875. This report states that § 54 7 (e)(3) of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act must be read in conjunction with § 547(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C.A. §
547(b)(2) (West Pamphlet 1979). S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1978), reprinted
in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5875.
460. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(e)(3) (West Pamphlet 1979).
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March 28.461 Under section 547(b)(2), 46 2 a transfer made within the
preference period is avoidable if it was made for or on account of an
antecedent debt "owed by the debtor before such transfer was
made." 4 63 Under that language, the relevant date is not the one on
which the distributor acquired the manufacturer's claim, but rather
the date on which that claim arose. The claims presumably arose,
however, when the units were shipped on March 28.464 Under this
analysis, the debt secured by the transfer was not antecedent.
In any event, section 547 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act would
not necessarily provide a basis for avoiding all security interests to the
extent that they are claimed to cover previously unsecured debt acquired shortly before bankruptcy by a secured party which holds a
security agreement with a dragnet provision. If the debtor had rights
in all of the collateral before the preference period began, section
547(e)(3) would not be relevant, 4 65 and the transfer would be deemed
to have been made outside the preference period if all other requirements had been met. In such a case, therefore, it would not
matter whether the acquired claim was an antecedent debt which, in
the terms of section 547(b)(2), was "owed by the debtor before such
transfer was made," or even whether it arose or was acquired during
46 6
the preference period.
In King-Porter, the district court held that the creation of the
security interest in the air conditioners was not only a voidable preference but also a fraudulent transfer under section 67d(2) of the
Bankruptcy Act. 4 67 The Fifth Circuit rejected the latter holding in
summary fashion, however, stating that the transfer clearly was not
made without fair consideration for purposes of section 67d(2) since,
as the court had already held for purposes of section 60a, value had
4 68
been given before the transfer occurred.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.

See U.C.C. § 2-401(2)(a).
11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(2) (West Pamphlet 1979).
Id.
See 466 F.2d at 725.
11 U.S.C.A. § 547(e)(3) (West Pamphlet 1979).
Id. § 547(b)(2).

467. 446 F.2d at 727. See Bankruptcy Act, § 67d(2), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2) (1976).
468. 446 F.2d at 733. While the Fifth Circuit's decision on this point may have been correct,
its terse discussion of the issue was inadequate. Its conclusion with respect to § 60a of the
Bankruptcy Act should not have controlled its consideration of the issue under § 67d(2) of the
Bankruptcy Act. The question of value was relevant under § 60a only in an indirect way since
under that section a transfer is deemed to have been made when it is perfected, and the giving
of value is a condition to perfection under the Code, See U.C.C. § 9-203(l)(b). The question of
value was more directly relevant under § 67d(2) since by its terms that section applies to transfers made without "fair consideration." 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2) (1976). A secured party cannot
avoid the impact of § 67d(2) merely by showing that some value was given. That value must

amount to fair consideration, which, as stated by one court, "requires both 'good faith' and 'fair
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Professor Kennedy has pointed out that the decision in KingPorter ignored the principle of Dean,469 "which condemns a security
interest for a contemporaneous advance given to enable the debtor to
pay off an unsecured debt on the eve of bankruptcy." 47 0 In fact, the
King-Porter court did not even consider section 67d(3) of the Bank4 71
ruptcy Act, which was a codification of that principle.
Neither the giving of fair consideration nor the trustee's inability
to prove actual fraudulent intent in King-Porter would have saved the
secured party under section 67d(3) of the Bankruptcy Act. 4 72 The
objectionable feature of the transaction subject to that section was the
intent to effect a preference as the result of a transfer made within
four months before bankruptcy. 4 73 In King-Porter, the Fifth Circuit.
held that, for purposes of the Bankruptcy Act's preference provisions,
474
the transfer occurred when the financing statements were filed, 4 75
and it later held in another case that for purposes of section 67d
the same rule applied. 47 6 Even under that reasoning, the transfer in
477
King-Porter occurred within four months before bankruptcy.
Moreover, the air conditioners were inventory, and a security interest
in inventory should always be deemed a transfer made immediately
78
before bankruptcy for purposes of section 67d.4
It is unlikely that the required intent to perfect a preference
existed when the financing statements were filed in King-Porter. The
acquired debt did not arise until about a month later, and the secured party did not acquire it until more than two weeks after it
arose.4 79 Even if the transfer is deemed to have been made when
the financing statements were filed, the date on which the secured
party acquired the previously unsecured debt is the relevant time for
determining whether the parties had the required intent and knowl48 0
edge.
equivalence.' " Misty Management Corp. v. Lockwood, 539 F.2d 1205, 1212 (9th Cir. 1976).
Under § 548(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(2)(A) (West Pamphlet

1979), the value must amount to "reasonably equivalent value." Id.
469. 242 U.S. 438 (1917). See note 206 and accompanying text supra.
470. Kennedy, supra note 450, at 770.
471. See 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(3) (1976); text accompanying note 207 supra.
472. See 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(3) (1976).
473. Id. For a discussion of this section, see notes 175-77 and accompanying text supra.
474. 446 F.2d at 730.
475. 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1976).
476. In re Wilco Forest Mach., Inc., 491 F.2d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir. 1974). But see Jackson v.
Star Sprinkler Corp., 575 F.2d 1223, 1231 n.14 (8th Cir. 1978).
477. The financing statements were filed on February 25, 1969. 446 F.2d at 730. The bankruptcy petition was filed on June 5, 1969. Id. at 726.
478. See notes 187-203 and accompanying text supra.
479. See 446 F.2d at 725.
480. Jackson v. Star Sprinkler Corp., 575 F.2d 1223, 1230-31 (8th Cir. 1978).
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Applying the foregoing analysis to Fretz and assuming that the
dragnet provision had been held to cover the claims acquired by Revlon from its subsidiaries, it is unlikely that the Fifth Circuit would
have upheld a challenge by the trustee under the preference provisions, because Revlon's financing statement was filed and it had given
48 1 If
some value more than four months before Fretz's bankruptcy.
section 9-301(4) of the 1972 text of the Code had been applicable,
such a challenge probably should have been upheld, however, since,
to the extent that the security interest covered the acquired debt, it
was not perfected as against a lien creditor on the date of bank48 2
ruptcy.
A challenge under section 67d(2) of the Bankruptcy Act probably
would have failed in Fretz. Under the reasoning of King-Porter, the
transfer occurred more than a year before bankruptcy, at least to the
extent that the collateral consisted of equipment. 48 3 Even if the
transfer were deemed to have been made immediately before bankruptcy to the extent that it consisted of inventory, it is likely that the
antecedent debt amounted to a fair consideration.
A challenge under section 67d(3) of the Bankruptcy Act would
also probably have failed in Fretz. To the extent that the collateral
consisted of inventory, the transfer should be deemed to have occurred immediately before bankruptcy. The transaction certainly
would have enabled Revlon's affiliates to obtain a greater percentage
of their claims than some other creditor of the same class and Revlon
obviously intended that result. Section 67d(3) explicitly required,
however, that the transferor have the intention of effecting a preference, and it is unlikely that Fretz even knew about Revlon's acquisi484
tion of its subsidiaries' claims.
As noted earlier, the Bankruptcy Reform Act contains no counterpart of section 67d(3) of the Bankruptcy Act, but the principle of
Dean will have a similar effect in many cases. 485 As Professor Kennedy has noted, the result in King-Porter is inconsistent with the
principle of Dean.4 86 In fact, that principle is free of the technical
language of section 67d(3), and it is conceivable that an innovative
court might extend it to cover cases such as King-Porter and Fretz.

481. See
bankruptcy
482. See
483. 565
484. See
quired the

565 F.2d at 367-68. The financing statement was filed on April 5, 1971 and the
petition was not filed until August 23, 1972. Id.
notes 396-407 and accompanying text supra.
F.2d at 367-68.
id. at 368. Fretz had been in bankruptcy approximately a month when Revlon acsubsidiaries' claims. Id.

485. See notes 204-13 and accompanying text supra.
486. Kennedy, supra note 450, at 770.
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Finally, Revlon would have encountered another problem in
Fretz if it had based its claim on the dragnet provision in the security
agreement. As the Fifth Circuit noted, "[p]riority in bankruptcy is
determined as of the date of bankruptcy," and "the policies of the
Bankruptcy Act would be greatly disserved" if post-bankruptcy assignments to Revlon by its subsidiaries were allowed to alter the
manner in which a distribution to creditors would otherwise be
made. 48 7 Without those assignments, Revlon's dragnet clause would
have been ineffective.
IV. CONCLUSIONS

Floating secured parties are not necessarily pirate ships which
should be sunk on sight. They sail under the protection of the Code,
subject to possible limitation under section 9-301(4) of the 1972 text.
Courts outside the Fifth Circuit should reject the Fretz decision and
be guided instead by Cushman and Industrial Packaging. If the Fifth
Circuit does not itself overrule Fretz at the first opportunity, it
should at least restrict the decision's precedential effect to cases in
which the secured party does not evea nominally hold the secured
debt. Floating secured parties who are in fact pirates sailing under
false colors can be adequately dealt with under the bankruptcy laws
by utilizing the preference and fraudulent transfer provisions of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act and the principle of Dean.
Similarly, floating debt should not be treated as contraband automatically subject to forfeiture in favor of unsecured creditors, lien
creditors, or trustees in bankruptcy. The relatedness rule has no
place in the Code's scheme of commercial law. Draftsmen of dragnet
provisions would be well advised to use language specifically including dissimilar and unrelated debt, however, and they must recognize
that the principles of unconscionability impose limitations on dragnet
provisions used in printed forms and other contracts of adhesion.
Secured parties must also recognize that their priority with respect to
debt acquired by assignment from other creditors probably will be
subject to the rights of lien creditors under section 9-301(4) of the
1972 text of the Code.

487. 565 F.2d at 374. Cf. In re Apollo Travel, Inc., 567 F.2d 841, 844-45 (8th Cir. 1977)
(citing the trustee's "strong arm" powers and holding that dragnet provisions cannot be used to
subordinate the trustee's position as a lien creditor to claims arising after he has taken possession of the assets); United States v. Columbia Erection Corp., 134 F. Supp. 305, 306 (W.D.
Mo. 1955) (debtor of bankrupt cannot buy other claims against the bankrupt after adjudication of
bankruptcy and then claim protection by virtue of the explicit set-off provision).
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The available bankruptcy tools are not adequate for dealing with
cases in which dragnet provisions may interfere with a fair distribution to creditors in bankruptcy. Where the secured party relies on
assignments made after bankruptcy, the strong arm provision of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act may provide the trustee with an adequate
weapon. Where section 9-301(4) of the 1972 text of the Code applies,
the preference provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act should be
effective in some cases. An innovative court might extend the principle of Dean to deal with a particularly egregious case. There are,
however, gaps in this coverage, and the Bankruptcy Reform Act
should be amended so as to give a trustee the power to avoid a security interest to the extent that it secures debt which the secured
party has acquired by assignment in any case where the creation of a
security interest directly in favor of the assignor could have been
avoided as a preference. An obvious model is provided by section
553(a) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 488 which invalidates a creditor's
setoff to the extent that it is based on a claim transferred to the creditor within the preference period or after commencement of a bank4 9
ruptcy proceeding.
Finally, the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code should reconsider section 9-208, which appears to have
been the result of casual conception and drafting. The section's purposes should be determined more precisely, and its text should then
be revised so that its intent is clearly effected. In particular, either
the text or the comment thereto should resolve whether and the extent to which section 9-208 is intended to qualify the priority rules of
section 9-312. If any qualification is intended, section 9-208 should
provide a procedure by which the secured party can identify and
measure its impact.

488. 11 U.S.C.A. § 553(a) (West Pamphlet 1979).
489. Id.
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